the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES 49
government. The basic unit was to be the battalion, with the battalion
commanders chosen by the local party councils from among the officer
reserve of the Red Army, local leaders with previous military service
and commissars of proven political reliability. Staffs for the battalion
commanders were to be formed in the Jurisdictional Committees and
the local Labor Councils. These battalions, further broken down into
companies and platoons, were given the various missions of securing
industrial plants and state and collective farms, resisting river crossings
by the enemy, destroying bridges and rail lines, and maintaining liaison
between partisan groups and between the partisans and the Red Army.
They were to live off the country and supply themselves with arms,
clothing, and signal equipment. 28
Early Partisan Operations
Thus as the German advance continued, the partisan groups fell into
four more or less distinct categories, each at least originally independent
of the others : the annihilation battalions, the groups formed by the local
Soviet administrations which approximated a loosely thrown together
"home guard," the battalions formed by the commissars under Mechlis'
order, and a miscellany of groups of bypassed Red Army personnel.
After the first weeks of the war, no effective groups of parachutists appeared
for some months. By 26 August the Germans were aware that
some of the partisans were in more than casual communication with the
Russian rear and had established a radio net of sorts. 29
At best these early organizational efforts of the Soviets, made in the
midst of the wild confusion following the German attack, produced only
meager results. There had been no prewar planning for guerrilla warfare
on a national scale and only some scattered preparation locally. 30
In the annihilation battalions morale was not of the best, for recruitment
was often forced, even within the ranks of the politically reliable,
and training was carried on after the long Soviet work day. The farther
the Germans penetrated the country the greater the signs of panic and
the larger the number of desertions. When leaders fled or were killed,
the battalions fell apart. 31 And the "home guard" units, which were
poorly armed and trained, were never a factor. The largest unit identified
as such was soon dispersed when its leaders fled. 32
28
Leaflet distributed to partisans by the People's Commissars, White Russia, and
the Central Committee X of the Communist Party in White Russia in Anl. Z.KTB 2,
1.IX.-7.XI.41., Korueck 553. 20383/8. This leaflet is undated, but its content
indicates that it was distributed soon after Stalin's radio proclamation.
29
KTB, 281 Sich. Div., 26.VIII.41. 15954/6.
30
See: Interrogation of Capt M. Pugatslov in Meldung 23, Chef der Sicherheits
Polizei und SD, 15. V11.41. Footlocker 62, folder 4; supplement to Eugenev Koslov
interrogation in KTBH. Geb. Nord. 14768/5; Shigunov interrogation, 14 Apr 42.
EAP 3-a-11/2(C).
31
Meldung 80, Einsatzgruppe C, 11I .IX.41. Footlocker 62, folder 10.
32
Ibid.