the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

178 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
over the previous month, and for the first time there were demolitions
west of Lida, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilna. 129
The incidence of other sabotage went up. There was a large increase
in damage to signal facilities: the Orsha-Minsk "U" cable was broken
in 296 places, an increase of 195 percent, and 7,163 telephone poles
representing a length of more than 200 miles of line were cut down.
Valuable ration and agricultural stocks were destroyed in raids or by
arson, one dump of 300 tons of rations and another containing 1,800
tons of potatoes and 170 tons of grain being burned. Deserters from
the indigenous units aided the bands in many of these raids. 130
German Attempts To Curb the Sabotage
With the German manpower situation what it was, only an extraordinary
effort by the security commands and a number of protective
innovations held the damage to this level. The replacement battalions
of the 1st Ski Brigade, totaling 3,000 men, were temporarily pulled
out of the pipeline and committed as track guards along the Minsk-
Brest-Litovsk line west of Baranovichi with an immediate reduction in
sabotage. Listening posts tied in with an alarm system were set up for
trial in one area. The use of searchlights along especially endangered
stretches of road reduced mine laying, as did the resumption of armorguarded
convoys maintained on a frequent schedule, the vehicles running
with bright lights. Antipersonnel mines were laid along trails
known to be used by partisans with emergency warning systems attached.
In the protection of signal facilities, alarm signals and "protective
strip illumination" attached to the lines themselves proved of
great value. Demolition charges were attached to telephone poles and
were rigged to explode when the partisans attempted to cut them down.
These proved very effective until the partisans forced women and children
to do the actual cutting for them. Bicycle "trolleys" were constructed
for patrolling along the rail lines and the more rapid
commitment of offensive units. Whenever the manpower was available,
even temporarily, "alert" forces were organized to deal with sudden
emergencies and vigorous patrolling was the order of the day for all
security commands that could scrape together a handful of men over
129
Ibid.
130 H. Gr. Mitte, la, Nr. 14550/43 g. Kdos., 8.XII.43., Ant. z. KTB, H. Cr. Mitte,
Fuehrungsabt.„4kte XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31 .XII.43. 65002/24; Korueck 559,
Ic. Tgb., Nr. 5103/43 geh., 27.XI.43., Korueck 559, Ia, 5.VII.-28.XII.43. 45668/4;
Anl. 99, 6.XI.43., KTB Korueck 559, 5.XI.-30.XII.43. 45668/3.