the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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154 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Germans and preferred to take their chances, dubious as they were, with the Soviets, whether they disliked the Bolshevik regime or not. 26 Preliminary Operations, May—June With the end of the muddy season and the approach of good campaigning weather, the Red Army could be expected to continue its heavy attacks toward the west all along the eastern line. The most sensitive points in the front and those sure to feel the earliest brunt of the Soviet attack were the Kharkov-Belgorod area, which Von Manstein had retaken in his March counterattack, and the Bryansk-Orel sector. Both of these positions could he hit hard in the flank from the 60 x 110 miles salient the Soviets held about Kursk. A successful push to the southwest through the Kharkov area would turn the German defenses in the south, making the entire eastern Ukraine untenable, and open up the flat, treeless steppes to Soviet armor. At the same time, a reduction of the German-held Bryansk-Orel bulge by a two-pronged attack from Kursk and the smaller salient at Kirov just to the north would at once protect the Red Army drive to the southwest and unhinge the whole central sector. A strong secondary attack could be expected in the Velikiye Luki-Nevel sector where the Soviets had driven a deep wedge between Army Groups Center and North. Partisan Concentration Areas and the Rail Lines The Orel defenses were supplied for the most part over two rail lines, both of which passed through Bryansk: the Smolensk-Roslavl-Bryansk- Lgov link and the east-west Minsk-Gomel-Bryansk line. As of 1 May a 50 mile stretch of the Roslavl-Bryansk line was under constant pressure from five partisan brigades totaling some 7,000 men, the Bryansk-Lgov link between Bryansk and a point just south of Lokot, another 50 mile stretch, was continually threatened by six brigades totaling more than 6,500 irregulars, while some 5,000 additional partisans lay astride the Bryansk-Gomel link. 27 In equally great danger were the seven highly important temporary bridges built over the Desna River south of Bryansk for use in the event of a forced withdrawal to the intermediate defense line west of the stream. 28 Further west the danger of paralysis of rail traffic was even greater. The Minsk-Gomel line, which carried much of Army Group South's supply traffic as well as that of the Second Army and Second Panzer Army, ran directly through the eastern portion of 26 See statement of captured partisan battalion commander in Amt Ausland/Abw., Befehlsstab Walli/Abw. III, Br. B. Nr. D 1138/43g (Ausw. 69). 23.11.43. in Abt. Wehrmacht Propaganda, 1.X1.42-31.11.43. OKW 639. 27 Bandenlage im Bereich d. Obkds, d. H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 30.1V.43. in H. Gr. Mitte Ic/A0 (Abw.). Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43. 65003/4. 28 See: Lage Ost. Stand: 16.VI.43. Oddly enough, these bridges were attacked by the bands.
THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 155 the Pripyat and lay highly vulnerable to attack by more than 10,000 irregulars. 29 In the Velikiye Luki-Nevel-Vitebsk area, the situation was little better. To supply its defenses there, the Third Panzer Army and the Fourth Army had the east-west Velikiye Luki-Rezekne and Vitebsk Polotsk-Dvinsk lines to Latvia and Lithuania and the lateral Nevel Vitebsk-Orsha link connecting with the army group's major supply route, Brest-Litovsk-Minsk-Smolensk. The lateral line, being near the front, remained generally free of interference, but the two east-west lines ran through an area dominated by some 18 partisan units comprising more than 11,000 men and the Brest-Litovsk-Smolensk line was under continual pressure from another group of bands totaling 8,000 to 9,000. 30 A number of other bands were concentrated in the southernmost portion of the army group rear directly west of Kursk and north of the Kursk-Kiev rail line. Although they totaled more than 8,000 men, they were constrained by the more open terrain and remained generally quiet during the spring and early summer. 31 As of 1 May by German estimate there were some 62,000 partisans in identified units in the central sector, with an additional 40,000 in bands as yet unidentified. 32 For the most part these were a far cry from the semi-independent bands of 1942 and early 1943. Under the leadership of the operations groups the organization and offensive potential of many of them had been vastly improved. Their loose concentrations had gradually been pulled together into tight-knit commands, with individual units assigned set areas as bases of operations, the operations groups exercising control through well-developed communications systems. This was especially true in the Bryansk and Nevel sectors. The organization in the Rosonno area west of Nevel had progressed to the point where the operations group there had divided the units under its control into two subcommands with separate staffs for each. 33 29 Bandenlage inz Bereich d. Obkds. d. H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 30.IV.43., in H. Gr. Mitte Ic/AO (Abw.), Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43. 65003/4. 30 Ibid. 31 Bericht Mai, Juni 43, Anl. 104 z. KTB, Bandenbekaenzpfung, AOK 2, Ia. 37418/107. 32 These figures include the Reichskomissariat Ostland. See: Entwicklung der Bandenstaerke (Ostfront). Anl. z. Bandenlage im Osten, Anlagen, OKH/Gen StdH/Gen Qu. Abt. II, g. Kdos. H 3/749; Bandenlage im Bereich d. Obkds. d. H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 30.IV.43., in H. Gr. Mitte Ic/AO (Abw.), Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43. 65003/4. 33 Bandenlage im Bereich d. H. Cr. Mitte, Stand: 30.V1.43., 30.V11.43., in H.Gr. Mitte Ic/A0 (Abw.), Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43. 65003/4; Stand: 1.IV.-1.V11.43.,Feindnachrichtenblatt ueber die Bandenlage im Bereich des Pz AOK 3, in Pz AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. E z. Taetigkeitsbericht 8, 22.I.-30.VI.43. 35568/50.
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
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6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
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Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
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PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
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PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
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PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
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PREINVASION PLANNING 15 limited obj
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PREINVASION PLANNING 17 and philoso
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PREINVASION PLANNING 19 district Ko
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PREINVASION PLANNING 21 torates, on
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PREINVASION PLANNING 23 world revol
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PREINVASION PLANNING 25 sions, of w
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GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD
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EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN
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CHAPTER 5 GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIE
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GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
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Chapter 6 THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 99 The commo
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 101 lective
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 103 Religion
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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