the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

112 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
and economic future of the USSR. 63 As early as January 1942 Army
Group Center saw how much damage had been done and believed
that the time was past when even a general revision of the whole propaganda
campaign could attain any decisive success, especially in the
face of the Russian winter successes. Still the situation might be
partially retrieved, Von Kluge told OKH, if the general policies regarding
the occupied territories and the propaganda approach were radically
overhauled. Then the Red Army's will to fight might be considerably
lessened and the deteriorating situation in the rear brought at least
partially under control. 64
Equally as shortsighted was Berlin's ignorance of the true nature and
power of the common Russian's love for his native land, a side of the
Russian mentality to which the Soviets constantly appealed in an effort
to stem the German tide. It was not based on any political consideration,
but on love of the soil and on a pride in Russian nationality which
had lasted throughout many wan and famines. It was never a product
of defiant defensiveness, as is sometimes the case in other cultures, nor
did it seem under ordinary circumstances to impose any special norms
of behavior on individuals. It was simply a national pride, completely
apolitical, and was effective in the fight against Hitler because Hitler
was a foreign tyrant. 65
Following the initial German attack, the Soviet propagandists had
quickly dropped the standard Communist slogans and placed heavy
emphasis on patriotism, playing up "The Great Patriotic War" and the
"fatherland." The masthead on Pravda was changed from "Workers
of the World, Unite!" to "Death to the German Invader." The old
czarist heroes were dragged out and the Russian victory over Napoleon
in812 was given wide play. 66 In answer to this, the Germans could
offer1 little more than their "liberation" theme, now worn somewhat thin.
To make a bad situation even more difficult, the civilian and paramilitary
agencies which followed on the heels of the operating armies,
the Reichskommissariate, the SS and police units, and the economic and
labor organizations, all instituted separate propaganda programs with
the result that the entire propaganda effort grew into a maze of independent,
unrelated, and uncoordinated projects. 67
63
Study, Col Bushmenov on propaganda questions, incl. in rpt, Representative of
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories with Army Group Center Rear
Area to the Ministry in Berlin, undated (early in 1942). EAP 99/480.
64
Rpt, Army Group Center to OKH on propaganda, 31 Jan 42. EAP 99/480.
65
Study, Col. Bushmenov on propaganda questions, incl. in rpt, Representative of
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories with Army Group Center Rear
Area to the Ministry in Berlin, undated (early in 1942). EAP 99/480; The Soviet
Army ("Service Conditions and Morale in the Soviet Armed Forces: A Pilot Study,"
vol. I, [Washington, 25 Aug 511) (S), pp. 37,42,74.
66 Ibid.
67 See: Buchsbaum, op. cit.