the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

76 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
ministrative Area. 72 In the Ukraine, where natural cover was scarce,
there were no bands of consequence in evidence outside the immediate
Dnepr swamp area.
The persistent partisan emphasis was on the rail lines, although it
never became overbearing during this period. The poor Russian roads
had taken a terrific toll of Wehrmacht transport, and when the fall rains
made all but the few paved highways virtually impassable it became impossible
to move supplies by truck in any appreciable quantity. The
result was an especially heavy load on the railroads. And then when
the Russian rolling stock began breaking down for a lack of proper maintenance
and the German engines, which had not been converted for
operations at extremely low temperatures, failed to operate with anything
like normal efficiency, the whole German supply system became
particularly sensitive to any rail sabotage. 73
A comparison of the German directives issued in the northern sector
in July and late in December reflect the steadily increasing activity by
the partisans aimed at the rail lines. On 12 July the 281st Security
Division was ordered to place guards on the rail bridge over the Niehen,
at the tunnel near Kovno, in the area west of the rail bridge near
Krustpils, on the rail bridge over the Dvina at Dvinsk, and on the rail
bridge north of Dvinsk. 74 On 20 December the same division ordered
that the lines Pskov-Ostrov-Rezekne and Pskov-Dno be secured with all
available forces in such a manner as to insure uninterrupted service.
All bridges and culverts less than 40 feet long were to have double sentries,
longer structures to be guarded by a squad of one noncommissioned
officer and six men. All stretches of rail in closed terrain were to have
one sentry every 100 yards; in open terrain one sentry every 200 yards;
sentries were to remain in sight of one another. Along all stretches
where partisans had been or might be expected, additional guards were
to be assigned. Each railroad yard was to be secured by at least one
company and all yards were to have a cleared area at least 300 yards wide
around them. This security schedule was not to be deviated from, even
if the last man in the division wasused. 75 Ten days later the same division
was so jittery that it ordered the metropolitan area about Ostrov
completely fortified by 15 January. 76
It is probable that the danger was exaggerated by the Germans, their
nerves strained by the rapidly deteriorating situation at the front. 77 At
72
Lagebericht I, Wi Kdo. Brynnsk. 9.I.42., KTB, Wi Kdo. Bryansk 17.XII.41.-
31.III.42; Lagebericht 5. Wi Kdo. Bryansk, 23.III.42. Wi/ID 284.
73
See: MS P-041r, "ORH Transportation Services," ch. I, pp. 37-13. OCMH.
Foreign Studies Br; "Halder's Journal." op. cit., VII, p. 203.
74
Befehl, Bfh. H. Geb. Nord. 12.VII.41., KTB, 281 Sich. Div. 15954/2.
75
281 Sich. Div., Ia. Nr. 714/41,20.XII.41., KTB, 281 Sich. Div. 15954/2.
76
281 Sich. Div., Ia. Nr. 740/41 geh., 30.XII.41., KTB, 281 Sich. Div. 15954/2.
77
See: Entries for period 20 Dec 41-1 Mar 42 in "Halder's Journal," op. cit. At
times Halder showed the effect of the pressure as much as the commanders at the
front.