the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 119
defensive measures only played into the hands of the bands and gave
them control of the situation. The objective should always be to seize
the initiative and throw the enemy on the defensive, to separate him
from the population, to deprive him of supplies from the countryside,
to limit his freedom of action, to encircle him, break him up, and pursue
him until he has been eliminated. The object was to destroy the bands,
not scatter or drive them away.
The first prerequisite for success was accurate information, and highest
priority was to be given to the establishment of an adequate intelligence
net. All sources of information were to be carefully and fully
exploited. A general information net composed of local inhabitants
and village officials was to be set up and exploited, a confidential agent
service established, and all prisoners carefully interrogated. After the
intelligence network was established definite preventive measures were
to be taken to limit the activity of the bands.
All residents were to be listed and nonresidents registered and carefully
controlled; a dependable communication system was to be established; a
number of strong support points were to be set up in the vicinity of important
installations both as defense against partisan raids and to bolster
the morale of the population; all protective cover which might be utilized
by the partisans as defensive strong points or as a mask for an attack was
to be eliminated.
Following the establishment of an information net and a system of
passive defense, the bands were to be attacked. Antipartisan action
was always to be taken only on the basis of sound intelligence, and was to
be swift, surprising, enveloping, and mobile. The main thrust whenever
possible was to be made against the camp of the partisan leaders, for once
the bands were deprived of their commanders, they generally were
easily broken up. This type of action presupposed trained shock troops
equipped with all necessary weapons.
The organization of "counter" or "dummy" bands was recommended.
They were to be made up of units from the security police and the security
service and of the Ordnungspolizei, with a number of reliable natives,
and committed in partisan-dominated areas in the manner of a
genuine partisan unit. In this manner they would be able to keep a
constant check on the sentiments of the population, make contact with
irregular units, and often quiet!y eliminate partisan leaders. 9
Hitler's renewed interest in 'the security of the rear areas and the
growing anti-German sentiments of the natives did not stop with his
directive of 18 August. On 26 August, OKW issued a supplementary
9 For results of this, see: OKH/Gen.St.d.H., FdeH/Ost, Nr. 2460/43 geh., 3.V.43.,
in Kdr. Gen. d. Sich. Tr. Sued Ia, Anl. 37, 30.IV.-1.VI11.43., Abw. Nachr. OKH,
Befh. H. Geb. Sued. 39502/41.
388413-56--9