the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

More documents

Recommendations

Info

GERMAN-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF STALINGRAD 135 on 25 June, cutting the Fourth Army's principal line of retreat. At the same time Rokossovski broke his armored units into the Germans' rear through a 20-mile hole in the Ninth Army's front, one column swinging north to encircle Bobruysk, the other driving on to the west. On 27 June he surrounded Bobruysk and trapped some 70,000 German troops. Both Orsha and Vitebsk fell on 27 June, and Mogilev the next day. The loss of these anchors of the line split the front into three segments and brought an end to defensive action on an army group basis. Thereafter, German opposition deteriorated rapidly. There was no letup in the attack, however, with Gen. I. Kh. Bagramyan's First Baltic Front units driving on Polotsk and Chernyakovski and Rokossovski's right wing enveloping Minsk from the north and south. The fall of the latter city on 4 July trapped almost the entire Fourth Army which was fighting some miles to the southeast. In just 10 days the Red Army had completely obliterated the Dnepr line between Polotsk and the Pripyat River and destroyed 25 German divisions. During the next week the pace continued with Baranovichi falling on 8 July and Vilna surrounded on 10 July. In the southern sector Konev and Rokossovski's left wing launched their summer offensive on 14 July. By 25 July Konev had surrounded Lwow while Rokossovski, swinging more to the northwest to maintain contact with his right wing, took Lublin on 22 July. Two days later he reached the Vistula and on 31 July his units stood only some 12 miles from Warsaw. With the drive through White Russia continuing, by the end of the first week in August the fight in the central and southern sectors had passed over the western boundary of the Soviet Union, whence BARBAROSSA had been launched more than three years before. Further to the north, Yeremenko, now commanding the Second Baltic Front had joined the general offensive on 13 July, attacking along an 80-mile front from Ostrov to the Dvina River. Model, then commanding Army Group Center, had foreseen just such an attack in the north and two days before it was launched had suggested that Army Group North withdraw from Estonia and northern Latvia to below the Dvina in order that its divisions might be used to stabilize the fast deteriorating situation in the central sector, but Hitler turned down the proposal. The Germans facing Yeremenko were strongly entrenched, but their position was without depth, and' when Opochka, the central anchor of the line, fell on 15 July they were forced to pull back to positions along the Dvinsk-Pskov rail line and re-form. Gen. I. I. Maslennikov now joined the fight with his Third Baltic Front just below Lake Peipus, taking Ostrov on 21 July and Pskov two clays later. On 25 July Yeremenko cut the road from Dvinsk to Riga, and the next day captured Dvinsk itself, forcing the Germans back 388413-56----10
136 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT further still. Here they were able to reestablish their line and hold. he same time Narva on the Gulf of Finland fell to units of the Leningrad Front. Meanwhile, Bagramyan had taken Polotsk the same day Minsk fell and then swung his attack to the northwest between Kovno and the Dvina. By 15 July he had driven open a 30-mile gap in the front at that point. Then, almost unopposed, he sent his armor racing on toward Riga. On 1 August he stood but 20 miles from the sea, virtually isolating both the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies. Generaloberst Ferdinand Schoerner, newly in command of Army Group North, then launched a series of local counterattacks and managed to stabilize his contracted line for a time as the rest of the eastern front quieted down. In six weeks the Red Army had driven more than 400 miles from the Dnepr to the Vistula; it had virtually destroyed Army Group Center, it had isolated Army Group North in the Baltic States, and in the south had driven the last German from Soviet soil except in the southern portion of Bessarabia. After a short pause, Maslennikov continued to push just south of Lake Peipus. By 15 August he achieved a breakthrough and then turned northward into Estonia. Chernyakovski, Bagramyan, and Yeremenko maintained their pressure but, continually checked by stubborn German resistance from a series of defense positions prepared in depth, were unable to break away. The capitulation of Finland early in September freed a number of troop units to the Leningrad Front and their added pressure forced Schoerner to evacuate Estonia through the narrow escape corridor along the southern shore of the Gulf of Riga which, using the last of his armor, he had been able to maintain in the face of all attacks. When Bagramyan found himself unable to cut through this last life line, he switched his main effort further to the south in a final drive to the coast. By 10 October he reached the Baltic Sea between Liepaja and Klaipeda. The remnants of Schoerner's armies were trapped in northern Latvia, and the Baltic campaign was at an end.
Page 2:
F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
Page 6 and 7:
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
Page 9:
PREFACE The purpose of this text is
Page 12 and 13:
viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
Page 14 and 15:
x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
Page 16 and 17:
2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
Page 18 and 19:
4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
Page 20 and 21:
6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
Page 22 and 23:
Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
Page 24 and 25:
PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
Page 26 and 27:
PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
Page 28 and 29:
PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
Page 30 and 31:
PREINVASION PLANNING 15 limited obj
Page 32 and 33:
PREINVASION PLANNING 17 and philoso
Page 34 and 35:
PREINVASION PLANNING 19 district Ko
Page 36 and 37:
PREINVASION PLANNING 21 torates, on
Page 38 and 39:
PREINVASION PLANNING 23 world revol
Page 40 and 41:
PREINVASION PLANNING 25 sions, of w
Page 42 and 43:
GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 77 and 78:
CHAPTER 5 GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIE
Page 79 and 80:
GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102: GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
Page 113 and 114: Chapter 6 THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
Page 115 and 116: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 99 The commo
Page 117 and 118: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 101 lective
Page 119 and 120: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 103 Religion
Page 121 and 122: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 105 was the
Page 123 and 124: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 107 The Forc
Page 125 and 126: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109 As the p
Page 127 and 128: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 111 This gro
Page 129 and 130: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
Page 131 and 132: THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
Page 133 and 134: THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
Page 139 and 140: F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
Page 141 and 142: 124 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT th
Page 143 and 144: 126 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT be
Page 145 and 146: 128 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT wa
Page 147 and 148: 130 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT fo
Page 149 and 150: 132 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT ti
Page 151: 134 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT be
Page 155 and 156: 138 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT ci
Page 157 and 158: Chart 3 ORGANIZATIOUIF A PARTISAN B
Page 159 and 160: THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT REACHES MATUR
Page 165 and 166: CHAPTER 10 THE PARTISANS AND THE C
Page 167 and 168: THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
Page 182 and 183: PARTISAN CONCENTRATIONS IN SECTOR O
Page 184 and 185: 162 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT no
Page 186 and 187: 164 on the rail lines of the centra
Page 188 and 189: 166 Soviet propaganda aimed at the
Page 190 and 191: 168 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT li
Page 192: 170 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT si
Page 202 and 203:
THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
Page 204 and 205:
THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
Page 206 and 207:
THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY—JUNE
Page 208 and 209:
THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
15 Anl. 43 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 14.
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 221:
ARMY GROUP CENTER REAR AREA' WINTER
Page 224 and 225:
196 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Th
Page 226 and 227:
198 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT be
Page 228 and 229:
200 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT of
Page 230 and 231:
202 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT su
Page 232 and 233:
204 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Ge
Page 234 and 235:
206 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT at
Page 236 and 237:
208 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT ar
Page 238 and 239:
210 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT we
Page 240 and 241:
212 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT me
Page 243 and 244:
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
Page 245:
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
show all

the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?