the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1944 195
solidating their areas of concentration during the last weeks of 1943
was part of a series of Moscow-directed steps to improve the operational
efficiency of the movement and realign its mission more closely with
that of the Red Army. Certainly the partisan support of the drive from
Orel into White Russia had not been overly impressive. True, with
their raids and sabotage the bands had hurt the Germans, but with a
strength in excess of 60,000 men, with good support from the Soviet
rear, and in terrain which heavily favored them, they had failed in their
mission of cutting off the supply of the German units at the front and
trapping them in the forward areas by blocking their axes of retreat.
And this was against an enemy preoccupied with staving off literal disaster.
Because they lacked experienced and aggressive leadership at the
unit level and tight, centralized control from the top, they had dissipated
much of their effort on areas and targets of lesser strategic significance
where the opposition was light or nonexistent and had failed to follow
up any advantages gained.
With the German rear now very shallow, the problem of correcting
these deficiencies was simplified considerably. Especial emphasis was
placed on tightening the regional and central command structures.
Operations group commanders in key areas were replaced with Red
Army officers of combat experience and proven aggressive leadership,
and command channels between the partisan staffs and the Soviet rear
were improved to the point where by the end of January almost every
move and change in disposition of the bands was dictated by the Central
Staff and subordinated to the future operational intentions of the Red
Army." At the same time the expansion and linking up of the concentration
areas continued until the bands were spread in almost continuous
blocks through the countryside just off the supply corridors. By 1
March this realignment of strength was virtually complete with hardly a
portion of the army group rear area or the Reichskommissariat Weissruthenien
outside the larger population centers where the partisans were
not either dominant militarily or poised in considerable numbers along
all the highways and railroads or which was not under a Communist
Party administration. Although the Germans still maintained a few
strong points in these regions, the garrisons were so heavily outnumbered
38
H. Gr. Mitte, Ic/AO (Abw.), Nr. 63/44 geh., 3.1.44. in KTB, H. Gr. Mitte
Bandenmeldungen, Nov 43—Maerz 44. 65002/69; H. Gr. Mitt e, Ia. Nr. 1620/44
g.Kdos., 8.II.44. in ibid.; H. Gr. Mitte, Ia, Nr. 14550/43 g.Kdos., 8.XII.43., Anl. z.
KTB. H. Gr. Mitte, 1.X.-31.XII.43. 65002/24; H. Gr. Mitte, Ia. Nr. 279/44
g.Kdos., 8.1.44., KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, 1.I.-31.III.44. 65002/48; 1st Lt. Larry Wolff,
"The Partisan Situation in Army Group Center, 1 January to 31 December 1944," pp.
1-8. OCMH files.