the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 157
Soviet Plans
The Soviet high command assigned the bands a prominent role in its
plans for the 1943 campaign. The Germans had made no particular
effort to conceal their buildup for Operation ZITADELLE; as a result
the Russians knew what to expect and where and were well prepared.
The Soviet strategy was to allow the German armored columns to batter
themselves to pieces against the deep, prepared defenses of the Kursk
salient and then launch a general counteroffensive when their strength
had been spent.
The bands were to support this counterblow, and plans for coordinating
their actions with the moves of the Red Army were made well in
advance. The plan was to hold them in readiness until ZITADELLE
had been stopped and the Germans were in the midst of a general
withdrawal, and then order them to strike all the rail lines at once,
blocking the Second Panzer and Ninth Armies in the forward areas
without prepared defenses where they might be cut off and destroyed.
The railroads were to be their principal target. Throughout the whole of
the central sector they were to strike at the rail lines "simultaneously"
on signal from Moscow and follow up "continuously" and "systematiccally."
Individual bands were assigned specific sections of trackage
and told how many rails they were expected to break in the first blow. 37
Special manuals on rail demolition technique were distributed and mines
and hulk explosives were air-landed well in advance. Air supply was
stepped up tremendously, for the first two weeks of May almost 1,000
percent over February. 38
German Counteraction
Although the Germans had no detailed foreknowledge of Soviet intentions,
they were aided by their nets of native informers and their highly
efficient signal intelligence 39 and were thus able to read the implications
of the bands' dispositions correctly. Unless they could take effective
preventive actions beforehand, they saw, the first move of the partisans
in the event of a Soviet general offensive would be to cut their lines of
communications and then attack from the rear. 40 At army level and
37
Order of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement No. 006, 17 Jul 43, in
KTB, General der Eisenbahntruppen. H 14/14; see also: Bericht Mai, Juni 43, Pz
AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. E z. Tgb. 8,22.I.-30.VI.43. 35568/50.
38
Bericht Mai, Juni 43, Pz AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. E z. Tgb. 8, 221-30.VI.43.
35568/50; Anl. 4 z. Bandenlage im Osten, Anlagen, OKH/Gen.St.d.H./GenQu.
Abt. II. H 3/749.
39
See: MS # P-038, "German Radio Intelligence," (S), pp. 206-12. Foreign
Studies Br. OCMH; Bericht Mai, Juni 43, Pz AOK 3, Ic/A0, Anl. Bd. E z. Tgb. 8,
22.I.-30.VI.43. 35568/50.
40
Ibid.; Feindnachrichtenblatt weber die Bandenlage im Bereich des Pz AOK 3,
Mai—Juni 43, Pz 3, Ic/A 0, Anl. Bd. E z. Tgb 8, 22.I.-30.VI.43. 35568/50.