the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 83
trol of the natives the minute the Germans were driven out or even before,
if circumstances permitted. Together with the bands they were
to work to drive a wedge between the people and the enemy, undermine
the enemy's control, and shorten his stay on Russian soil. 99
Morale and Discipline in the Bands
Despite the progress made toward improving the organization of the
hands and raising the quality of their leadership and the level of their
operational efficiency, the unit commanders found themselves continually
hampered by the same problems of morale and discipline inherent
in an): quasi-military force. Morale and discipline remained fairly good
among the former Red Army personnel, who had with considerable
reason come to fear the German prisoner of war camps, the convinced
Communists, and those who had been with the bands any length of
time. But with the less stable elements, the lazj., lawless individuals
who can be found in any country and who join only for the opportunity
to plunder, and particularly with those drafted from the rural areas, the
desertion rate ran high, especially if an action was prolonged. German
interrogation of such deserters indicated that many more would desert
if they knew they would not be executed as guerrillas. 100
The problem of morale was recognized in Moscow and received careful
attention there. A propaganda campaign was projected with the
objective of creating an esprit de corps in the bands and a definite sense
of "belonging" to the national defense effort. The expression "partisan"
was dropped from official usage and the expression "soldier of the
Red Army in the rear of the enemy" substituted. Prior to the reorganization
several of the larger bands were designated as armies "in the
Rear of the Enemy." 101 Special decorations were authorized for outstanding
partisan work. 102 Locally published propaganda newspapers
extolling the exploits of outstanding irregulars were issued by political
officers for consumption within the units, and the Moscow and Leningrad
editions of Pravda were regularly received by air in many partisancontrolled
areas. l03
The better organized bands demonstrated a fair degree of combat
discipline. They consistently refused to allow themselves to be trapped
99
Ibid.
100
Bericht ueber Unternehnren Vogelsang der 339 ID, Beilage zum KTB Pz AOK 2,
Bericht Nr. 1505/42 g., 28499/58.: Tgb., Ic. 221 Inf. Div., 22.III.-l7.VI.42. 22639;
Bericht, Ic. Korueck 584, 22.VI.42., Anl. 158 z. KTB 3, Korueck 584. 38998/2.
101
Nachrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 1, 3.V.43., OKH/Fde. H. Ost. 3/738;
Bericht 4, Ic, AOK 2, 15.IV.42., Anl. 362 z. KTB. AOK 2, Band 4. 2361 7/62.
102
Bericht 4, Ic, AOK 2, 15.IV.42., Anl. 362 z. KTB, AOK 2, Band 4. 23617/62;
"Top Leadership in the Soviet Ground Forces," Intelligence Research Project No.
6549, 24 Jul 51. G-2 Library.
103
Bericht, Ic, Korueck 584,22.VI.42., Anl. 1582. KTB 3, Korueck 584. 38998/2 ;
Bericht, Ia, H. Geb. Sued, 31 .XII.41.-V.42. 22571/17.