the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

212 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
ment, once well started, is extremely difficult to combat. Therefore
the surest way to combat a resistance movement is to strike at its roots,
that is, never let it get started.
3. The best preventive measures are :
a. Proper detailed occupational planning executed prior to the
occupation;
b. A clear understanding of the people themselves with whom the
occupation must deal, psychological, ethnological, and ideological
characteristics;
c. A unified and centrally controlled administration of the areas
occupied; and
d. A firm but fair occupation administration combining, as Jomini
saw it, courtesy, gentleness, severity, and just dealing. If the mass of
the people can be won over, or at least induced not to aid the partisans,
the movement will die on the vine.
4. If an army in the midst of an operational campaign should find
itself confronted by a resistance movement in its zone of communications,
it should :
a. Never allow the partisans to divert it from its primary mission
of front-line combat to the extent of weakening that front.
b. Rather view the situation in its proper perspective, remembering
that partisans as such have a very limited combat value, and react
accordingly.
c. Strike hard with sufficient first-line troops or, if such should not
be feasible at the time, pull itself in on its major communication axes
and let the rest go for the time being, confident that it possesses the
organization and strength to clear the rear if it later becomes necessary.
In the field of antipartisan tactics the following basic principles should
be applied :
1. The objective of an antipartisan operation should always be complete
annihilation of the enemy in the attacked area, not expulsion from
the area.
2. Command should always be unified under an experienced frontline
commander no matter how diverse the composite elements of the force.
3. Preparation for an antipartisan operation should be made by a
General Staff operations section and as carefully as in the case of an
operation at the front.
4. The most complete and up-to-date information possible should be
obtained prior to the operation and should be kept current during the
course of the operation.
5. The most complete security possible should be maintained during
the planning and the assembly of troops in order to preserve the element
of surprise.