the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

148 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
linked up with the bands behind the Sixteenth Army in the Nevel region. 4
In the territory between Orel and Gomel the German security commands
by 1 March had identified 34 separate partisan units totaling
an estimated 28,000 men. Nine of these were of brigade size comprising
more than 500 men each. In the Pripyat west of Gomel were 26
smaller bands totaling 7,500 men, and behind the Third Panzer Army
in the Orsha-Vitebsk-Nevel region 37 bands totaling some 21,000 men.
In the rear of the Ninth and Second Armies were smaller groupings
totaling an estimated 2,900 in each case. 5 West of the Dnepr in the
southern edge of the Pripyat there were estimated to be some 12,500
additional partisans in units as yet unidentified. 6 On 15 March according
to German estimate the number of partisans in organized units
totaled 77,800, of which 3,000 were east of the Dnepr in the more immediate
rear of Army Group South, 57,800 4,500 behind Army Group Center,
in the rear of Army Group North, and 12,500 in that portion of
the Pripyat Marshes just south of the Army Group Center boundary.
German Forces
Facing these, the Germans had a heterogeneous force of German security
units, satellite security brigades and divisions, Ostbataillone or
native security units, the Einwohner Kampf Abteilungen (EKA) or local
volunteer units, the Hilfswillige (Hiwis) or foreign labor auxiliaries,
and the Volkswehr or anti-Soviet people's defense units.
Although on paper such a force appeared rather formidable, in practice
it fell far below the standards necessary to even contain the growing
hands. This was true as regarded both the quantity and quality of the
troops concerned. The strength of the security commands was built
around the German security units, but where these had formerly been
of division size, because of continued withdrawals to plug gaps in the
front lines or furnish replacements for shattered line organizations, they
now represented but a number of scattered and understrength Landesschuetzen
battalions. Not only were they insufficiently trained and
equipped for their missions, but their personnel were too old for the
exacting physical task of all-weather operations in forests and swamps.
There was no provision for regular replacement of losses, and combat
strengths remained low. The satellite units were of very doubtful
quality. The native units, made up variously of Estonians, Latvians,
Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Tartars,
Cossacks, and others, as a whole represented a very low combat value.
4
Bandenlage in Bereich d. H. Gr. Mitte, Stand: 31.111.43., 28.11.43., Aid. 2, Bandenlisten,
Februar bis September 43, H. Cr. Mitte. 65003/4.
5
Zusammenstellung ueber Bandenlage mit Stand corn 28.11.43., Okdo der H. Gr. Mitte, Abt.
1c/A0 Nr. 2475/43 geh., 16.111.43. in Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43, H. Cr.
Mitte/lc/AO (Abw.). 65003/4.
6
Entwicklung der Bandenstaerke (Ostfront), Anlage 5, z. Bandenlage im Osten,Anlgen,
OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Gen Qu. Abt. II, g. Kdos. H3/749