the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES 59 who came out of hiding after actual combat was over and renewed the fight in the rear were to be treated as guerrillas. All soldiers who were, involved in actions with a "people's war" tinge-sabotage, attacks on single vehicles, and the like-were to be considered guerrillas. Troop commanders were to draw the distinction on their own initiative. 78 The OKW Approach The reaction of OKW to these beginnings of resistance was but an elaboration of the policies regarding the treatment to be accorded the Russian people laid down in the political and economic planning. The whole of the occupied territories had to be pacified as quickly as possible. The resistance there had to be crushed. The best method was a strict reign of terror. 78 When the security commands encountered increasing difficulty in keeping the lines of communication clear and began to request more units for security duties, the OKW reply was typical: The troops available for securing the conquered eastern areas will, considering the vast expanse of these stretches, suffice only if the occupying power meets all resistance, not by legally punishing the guilty, but rather by spreading that type of terror which is the only means of taking from the population every desire for opposition. The respective commanders are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet in their areas. The commanders must find the means to keep their districts in order by employing suitable draconian measures, not by requesting more security forces. 80 The approach to pacification was to be heavyhanded. There was to be no other. Resistance was to be crushed in a ruthless manner, not turned into more harmless channels. As the weeks passed the evidences of revolt did not lessen, and in mid-September OKW took an even more repressive approach: * * * The measures taken up to now to deal with this general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time. * * * Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions : 78 AOK 9, Ic, Nr. 271/41 geh., 20.IX.42., Anl. z.KTB, Ic, Korueck 582. 17326/15. This is not the Hitler directive, but a digest of it by the Ninth Army for distribution to lower echelons. 79 Aktenvermerk, Fuehrerhauptquartier, 16.VII.41., in I.M.T., op. cit., XXXVIII, pp. 86-94. 80 Supplement to Dir 33, 23 Jul 41, OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op). Nr. 442254/41 g. K. Chefs. in "Fuehrer Directives," op. cit.
60 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin. b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for y. 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect. The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed. 81 * * * There is little evidence that these directives were carried out by the line armies. The indications are that, with but few exceptions, 82 they were ignored and the OKH policy was generally followed in the zone of operations. There was no attempt to soften the effect of such tactics by a change in the psychological approach. Propaganda remained negative, and even verged on the hypocritical. It was designed primarily to keep the population from joining or supporting the partisans. They were to be promised nothing. Beyond threats, warnings, and prohibitions, the emphasis was to remain on the role of the Germans as "liberators" come to create "a new system of social justice." The people in the individual Soviet republics were to be given no expectation of the restoration of their national sovereignty and no encouragement toward the development of a national consciousness. There were to be told merely that their political future would be worked out after the war. The peasantry was to be cautiously told that for the time being the collective farms were not to be broken up, that such would lead to too much economic dislocation. The one concession granted was in the matter of religion. The religious question was to be viewed as the business of the individual, to be tolerated but not encouraged. 83 81 Kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung in den besetrten Gebieten, Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, WFSt/Abt. 1 (IV/Qu), Nr. 002060/41. g. Kdos., 16.IX.41. in I.M.T., op. cit., XXXIV, pp. 501-04; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, op. cit., VI, pp. 961-63. 82 See: Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, Armeeoberkommando 6, Abt. Ia-Az., 7, A. H. Qu., den 10.X.41. in I.M.T., op. cit., XXXV, pp. 84-86. 83 OKW/WFSt/WPr (I a) Nr. 486/41 g. K., 21.VIII.41. OKW/1939.
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
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Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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Chart 3 ORGANIZATIOUIF A PARTISAN B
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THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT REACHES MATUR
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CHAPTER 10 THE PARTISANS AND THE C
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THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
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PARTISAN CONCENTRATIONS IN SECTOR O
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164 on the rail lines of the centra
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY—JUNE
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1
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15 Anl. 43 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 14.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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