the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

170 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
size and number, recruiting successfully among the more dissident elements
of the population and being reinforced both from the Soviet rear
and by desertions from the Ost. 92
This situation was considerably worsened late in September when
150,000 civilians—men, women, and children—were ordered evacuated
from the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus "on foot." 93 The
Eighteenth Army, in protesting, reported that there were no facilities for
caring for the evacuees on the march and no camps suitable for housing
them within 90 miles, and that even while the move was only in process of
organization the details of the plan became widely known and large
numbers of the natives began going over to the partisans in self-defense.
Such open mistreatment, the report continued, presaged a great
intensification of partisan activity and a complete breakdown of morale and
discipline – M the indigenous units with resultant disaffection and desertion
to the bands. 94
In the southern sector, sabotage increased somewhat during July, but was
not generally aimed at the German lines of communication. The few larger
bands there remained quiet, but during the month a number of small units of
8 to 10 men, apparently under some sort of central control, appeared in the
northern portion of the area hitting sharply at harvesting machinery and
grain storage facilities. 95 Rather obviously the Soviet high command, if
indeed it had control of these groups, did not intend that the Germans make
any harvest or carry any surplus food stocks with them in their withdrawal.
In August coincident with the Red Army attack in the central sector,
there was a considerable increase in partisan activity along the traffic
arteries leading into Kiev, especially west of the Dnepr River. Although
this caused a number of short interruptions in traffic and was generally
"a great nuisance," it caused no critical delays in supply for the front. 96
As the fighting moved steadily westward, most of the bands east of the
Dnepr moved across the river into the lower edges of the Pripyat Marsh.
This general westward movement of the whole war in the south brought
92 Bericht, Sept, 43, AOK 16, Ia. KTB 5, T eil VII, Bandenakten, 1.VII.-31.XII.43.
44185/69.
93 The origin of this order is unknown. See: Bericht, AOK 18 to Gen. der
Ostruppen, H. Cr. Nord. 7.X.43., AOK 18, la, Nachreichungen d. Abt. Ic/AO,
43 45. 64847. This is not the directive, but a report by the Eighteenth Army
giving the provisions of the order and protesting.
94
Ibid.
95 H. Geb. Sued, lc. Nr. 182/43g., 4.VIII.43., KTB, H. Geb. Sued, Juli 43.
39502/1.
96 The German Military Transport System in Southern Russia, Romania, and
Hungary from 24 November 1942 to 25 March 1945," p. 14. MS # D-139.
Foreign Studies Br, OCMH; Bandenlage, August 43, Korueck 585, Anl. z. KTB.
10.IX.-17.X.43. 44172/3; OKH/Fde. H. Ost (I), Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage,
1.IX.-31.X.43. H 3/204.