the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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62 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT industrial areas there was some suffering and morale was low. Although the crops were generally good and sufficient manpower was available for the harvest, the farm machinery so necessary for harvesting on other than a small scale had either been removed or demolished by the Reds and the draft animals driven off. Cattle were not to be found. 4 This situation was accentuated by a complete lack of initiative on the part of the peasants. Unless closely supervised they would do no work beyond that necessary to fill personal needs and once they had harvested enough to carry their families through the winter they had to be driven to work further. 5 Only rarely had they complied with Stalin's order to destroy all crops rather than allow them to fall into German hands, but groups of the younger generation in several areas instituted a minor reign of terror on their own, burning a number of farm installations and openly declaring that all barns and silos in the occupied areas would be destroyed after the crops had been gathered. 6 Such action did nothing to improve the morale and will-to-work of the peasants, and the Germans found it difficult to combat. In White Russia in many cases the collective farms had resumed operation but since the Germans had requisitioned all available trucks there was never enough transport to carry food supplies to the cities where the people were in need. 7 In the northern sector matters were even more critical. Many crops were not or could not be harvested, and farmers began to fear they would be unable to feed what stock they had left during the winter. As late as November, 35 percent of the potatoes and other bulbar roots were still in the ground, destroyed by the frost. 8 The general food situation was considerably worsened by the plundering of German troops. 9 Despair and suffering appeared even in the undevastated urban areas, and the spectre of unemployment hung over the land. Large numbers of people in Pskov and the Leningrad region were without work. 10 The "white collar" groups, which had been relatively privileged under the Soviet regime, walked the streets in most places. 11 The people complained that they had been misled by German propaganda. The occupation authorities countered, rather ineffectively, that the cause of short rations was to be found among the Russians themselves, in the 4 Meldung 40, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD. Footlocker 62, folder 5. 5 Rpt of agricultural staff with Army Group South, 16 Oct 41, in Wi Stab Ost. Wi/ID 2.1355; Bericht, WiStab Ost, 26.I.42. Wi/ID 2.31 7b. 6 KTB, H. Geb. Sued, 27.VIII.41. 16407/17. 7 Meldung 43, Einsatzgruppe B, 5.VIII.41. Footlocker 62, folder 5. 8 Meldung 131, Einsatzgruppe A, 10.XI.41. Footlocker 62, folder 11. 9 An1 12 z. Bericht Wi Stab, Krusnowardekk, Okt 41. Wi/ID 2.189; Meldung 43, 5.VIII.41., Einsatzgruppe B. Footlocker 62, folder 5. 10 Bericht, Wi Stab Ost. 16.IX.-30.IX.41. Wi/ID 2.345. l1 Meldung 106, Chef der Sicherheitspolirei und SD, 7.X.41. Footlocker 62, folder 7.
GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 63 looting and destruction of food stocks by the Communists. 12 The change of popular temper became so obvious and food so short that Army Group North, realizing that such conditions created fertile ground for the spread of the partisan movement, early in November ordered largescale evacuations from the worst affected areas in order to avoid possible riots and epidemics. 13 The Communists and partisan bands did much to lower public morale even further and add to the general feeling of insecurity. With party functionaries and NKVD personnel concentrating on the cities, the partisans launched a number of deliberately designed terror attacks on small rural communities. Appearing in sizeable groups, they struck at state and collective farms, machine tractor stations, and villages, forcibly requisitioning livestock and food supplies or wantonly destroying agricultural stockpiles, demolishing machinery, and butchering cattle. 14 These attacks were designed both to remove a possible source of provender for the Germans and supply the needs of the bands, and at the same time pose a constant reminder on the people that the Soviet arm was long and the hand of the party ever The pressure readily showed and in several districts all agricultural pursuits came to a complete standstill, so greatly did the peasants fear these raids. 15 Under such compulsion the reluctance of the people to work closely with or even to approach the occupation authorities spread, and a number of partisan reprisal murders of German-appointed mayors and elders made it difficult to find individuals willing to serve in such capacities. Thus the establishment of a workable administration was definitely hampered. 16 In some areas the native volunteer units were similarly affected. 17 The fear of an eventual Soviet return was especially prevalent among the urban population, which had seen the NKVD at work at closer hand than had the peasants; and in areas where the German advance slowed down or the front became stabilized there were instances of passive resistance. 18 Russian Propaganda In conjunction with the terror attacks, the Soviets launched a virulent propaganda campaign. Although some of this propaganda was put 12 Befehl 44, Wi Stab Ost. anl. z. OKH/GenStdH/GenQu, Nr. 7732/41 geh., 4.XI.41., KTB H. Gp. Nord. 75133/32. 13 KTB, Ia, 281 Sich. Div., 3.XI.41. 15954/2. 14 KTB, 281 Sich. Div., 22.1X.41. 15954/2; KTB, Wi. Kdo. z.b.V. 'Goerlitz' 9.VI.-30.IX.41. Wi/ID 2.357; Anl. 58 z. Bericht JVi Stab Ost, 16.IX.-30.1X.41. Wi/ID 2.345. 15 Bericht, Wi Stab Sued. 3.IX.-16.X.41. Wi/ID 2.1355 ; rpt, econ officer with Fourth Army, 16 Oct 41, in Wi Stab Ost. Wi/ID 2.3 19. 16 KTB, 285 Sich. Div., 23.IX.41. 14878/10. l7 Meldung 106, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD, 7.X.41. Footlocker 62, folder 5 ; Bericht Wi Stab Ost, 16.IX.-30.IX.41. Wi/ID 2.345. 18 Meldung 38, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD, 30. VII.41. Footlocker 62, folder 5. Bericht Wi Stab Ost, 16.IX.-30.IX.41. Wi/ID2.345.
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
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6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
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Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
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PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
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PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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Chart 3 ORGANIZATIOUIF A PARTISAN B
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THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT REACHES MATUR
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CHAPTER 10 THE PARTISANS AND THE C
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THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
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PARTISAN CONCENTRATIONS IN SECTOR O
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164 on the rail lines of the centra
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166 Soviet propaganda aimed at the
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170 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT si
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY—JUNE
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1
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15 Anl. 43 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 14.
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ARMY GROUP CENTER REAR AREA' WINTER
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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