the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

92 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
Passive Measures
These limited offensives represented the maximum direct pressure the
Germans could bring to bear on the bands at the time. Beyond this, in
a purely military sense, they could only garrison or outpost certain selected
localities, guard their installations, and screen their primary supply
lines against major interruptions, leaving the initiative with the enemy.
They well knew that such measures alone could never crush the movement
or even contain it. Yet they knew equally well that it had to be
contained before it grew into a really open menace, and that the support
of the people was the key to the problem.
The Russian winter successes had done much to destroy the confidence
of the population in the Germans. Unprotected all winter from
the terror tactics of the partisans and still exposed to their pressure at
the end of the muddy season, the natives had begun to see that their
"liberators" too often could not control the vast areas they had overrun.
And taking the line of least resistance they began to support the bands
more and more, sometimes under duress, though more often voluntarily l45 .
Recognizing this shift of popular sentiment for the hazard it was and
realizing that Germany was in danger of losing completely the only
popular support it had ever enjoyed in any country invaded to date,
the Army, in conjunction with the antipartisan drives, attempted to
counter the threat by modifying its policy of reprisals and collective
punitive actions. These had heretofore been standard practice as retaliation
for raids by the bands and to prevent the natives from aiding
them. Experience had shown, however, that such measures had not
had the desired effect and in many cases had driven sizable blocks
of the people into active cooperation with the bands. At the same
time they had fed raw material into the Soviet propaganda machine. 146
Accordingly, OKH directed that retaliatory measures be taken only
when absolutely necessary to maintain German authority, and only
after the reasons for such were carefully explained to the people. 147
Experience gained during subsequent antipartisan offensives not only
bore out the soundness of this change of policy but also indicated additional
measures which might further undermine the strength of the
bands. Captured documents and interrogations of partisan prisoners
conclusively demonstrated that while reprisals as a means of weaning
145 Monatsbericht, Juni 42, 201 Sich. Div., Anl. z. KTB, la, 201 Sich. Div., 1.IV.-
31.XII.42., 29196/2; Army Group North to Army Group North Rear Area, 19 Jun
42, in KTB, H. Gr Nord, 1.VI.-.30.VI.42. 75128/11.
146 Entry for 11 Aug 42 in KTB, H. Gr Nord, p. 3164. 75128/13 ; evaluation rpt,
Corps Rear Area 447, in Evakuierungen z. KTB 2, Pz AOK 2, 23.V.-5.IX.42.
28499/72; OKH/Gen. St. d. H./Gen. Qu. Nr. 3033/42,7.V.42., Anl. z. KTB, Ia, H.
Geb. B, 1.VI.-30.VI.42. 25124/1.
147
Ibid.; OKH/Gen. St. d. H./Gen. Qu. Nr. 3033/42, 7.V.42., Anl. z. KTB, Ia, H.
Geb. B, I.VI.-30.VI.42. 25124/1.