the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 65
German soldier, under good discipline and acting in a reasonably circumspect
manner, had left a favorable impression. In his wake, however,
had come the field administrative units with no well-integrated
plan who were unable to either control the indiscriminate killing and
looting of the police forces and the Einsatzgruppen or provide an adequate
food supply. They wondered further at the rude treatment
accorded Red Army prisoners, numbers of whom they had seen drop
dead from starvation. 27 They were used to having every detail of their
lives regulated and to being told what they might do and when they
might do it. Without this close control they became restless and wondered
further. 28 Since the radios in many areas had been confiscated,
the official Wehrmacht broadcasts often went unheard and the people
were uninformed of German plans for their welfare, of the German
orders they were expected to obey, and of German desires and occupational
intentions. There were few public-address systems in use outside
the large population centers. 29
Such a dearth of information provided a fertile breeding ground for
rumors of all kinds and played directly into the hands of the Soviet
propagandists. News that the Poles in eastern Galicia and the Volhynian
border areas were treated with more consideration than the Ukrainians
farther to the east did little to improve matters. 30 Still, despite all these
indications of lowering morale, the people did not go over to the
partisans in any numbers and, other than Communist Party members,
few showed any open antagonism.
The Partisan Movement Becomes Independent
In the early fall, apparently some time in September, the control and
direction of the partisans was taken from Mechlis' command and placed
under the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. This was a new
department which was to operate independently of both the Red Army
and the NKVD under the direct control of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party. Red Army Marshal Voroshilov was its first head. 31
27
Bericht, Wi.Stab Ost, 16.IX.41. Wi/ID 2.345.
28
Bericht, Wi. Stab Sued,16.X.41. Wi/ID 2.1355.
29
Meldung 38, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD, 30.VII.41. KTB,H. Geb.
Sued, 25. VII.41. 16407/17. Footlocker 62, folder 5.
30
KTB, H. Geb. Sued, 25.VII.41. 16407/17; Meldung 100, Chef der Sicherheit
spolizei und SD, I.X.41. Footlocker 62, folder 5; Bericht, Wi Stab Ost, 16.X.41.
Wi/ID 2.1355.
31
Little factual material on the first set-up is available. See: ID, "Survey of
Soviet Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence," (S) ARM-A G-2 1 SIC. OCMH,
Gen Ref Br; "Organization and Mission of the Soviet Secret Service," (TS) (hereafter
cited as NKVD Document). SD-9129, ID Library. This is a translation of
a German appreciation of the Soviet Secret Service, made in 1944on the basis of
three years of war with the Soviet Union. The translation was made by the 258th
Interrogation team and is undocumented