the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

166
Soviet propaganda aimed at the civil populace increased both in
volume and in quality. 73
Before the withdrawal to the positions east of the Desna was complete
the Soviet attack shifted with such violence to the front of the Fourth
Army defending the Smolensk sector and along the boundary between
Army Groups South and Center in the area of the Fourth Panzer and
Second Armies directly ast of Kursk that a proper balancing of forces
was found to be no 1 nger possible. A new withdrawal became necessary,
this time of the entire army group, to positions paralleling the line
upper Dnepr-Orsha-Vitebsk-Nevel and some 30 miles to the east. This
withdrawal continued throughout September and was completed on
1 October.
Throughout all of September the transport situation in the central
sector remained serious due to partisan action, and, although the distance
to the front grew progressively less and supply and troop movements
from the Zone of the Interior decreased proportionately, the difficulties
caused by the bands were greater than during the previous
withdrawal because this time the whole army group was involved. In
actual volume partisan activity decreased from the previous month,
but was generally more effective. Although the rear area was slowly
compressed and the total mileage of communication lines was steadily
cut down by the retrograde movement, this was far more than offset
by the continued heavy pressure of the Red Army and the fact that so
many of the German security units were either fighting at the front
or on the move to areas further west. As news of the succeeding German
reverses spread the increasing number of desertions of local railway
personnel and of whole companies and battalions of indigenous units
(the latter units often killing the German cadres) added further difficulties
. The general military and political situation drove increasing
numbers of heretofore neutral civilians into the bands, and in some cases
these civilians, incensed by rumors and Soviet propaganda, made heavy
armed raids on German-occupied villages. Others withdrawing with
the German divisions went over to the bands because of their fear of the
forced labor draft. 74
73
Ibid.; Bericht, Korueck 559, Ic, Tgb. Nr. 2952/43 geh., 31.VII.43 ., KTB Heft
3, Anl. 1-17. 45668/4. Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation
ZITADELLE (1943)," pp. 12-13. MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH. ;
AOK 9, Anl. 2, KTB 9, 19.VIII.-15.X.43., Fuehrungsabt, II, Tagesmeldungen.
52535/2.
74
H. Gr. Mitte, Ia. Nr. 11822/43 g. Kdos., 171.43., Anl, z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte,
Fuehrungsabt., Akte XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31.XII.43. 65002/24; Bericht, September
43, Pz AOK 3, Ant. Bd. 2, Tgb. 9, Ic/AO, 1.VII.-30.IX.43. 40252/7;
Bericht, September 43, AOK 2, Ia, Anl z. KTB Russland, Schriftwechsel Bandenbekaempfung
III, 21.VI.-29.X.43. 60311/21; Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation
Operation ZITADELLE (1943)," pp. 13-14. MS # D-369. Foreign
Studies Br, OCMH. Teske, op. cit., pp. 195-97.