the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

82 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
ganization was assigned a Red Army intelligence section and a special
unit of the counterintelligence agency 00NKVD. 96
The brigades and groups were normally designated by the names of
Russian heroes past or present or by the geographical area in which they
operated. The lower echelon units were generally known by the names
of their respective commanders.
The home guard units were formed one for each village in partisan
dominated areas, with all men, youths, and women liable for service.
Through these the Soviets hoped to instigate popular armed risings.
It was during this same general period that Voroshilov was relieved
as chief of the Central Staff and replaced by P. K. Ponomarenko, a
high-ranking Communist Party official who prior to the war had been
chairman of the Council of Ministers of the White Russian SSR. 97 Just
what was behind this change of personalities is not clear. It appears
to have been a measure designed to place the partisan movement under
more rigid party-as opposed to Red Army-control, for at very nearly
the same time the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow
was launching an all-out effort to reestablish the Communist Party in
the German occupied areas, and in any series of steps taken to reassert
Conlmunist domination in the enemy rear prior to the return of the
Red Army the bands would be a potent factor provided they could be
adequately controlled . 98
The Bands and Soviet Strategy
With these concurrent military and political moves, Soviet strategy
with regard to the German rear began to take form. One principle
overshadowed all others: the Communist regime was going to return.
The bands were to lend tactical aid to the Red Army as fighting units;
they were to gather information of long-range and immediate tactical
value, continually attack the German lines of communication, breaking
rails, blowing bridges, and raiding outposts, all in cooperation with the
offensive or defensive moves of the regular units; they were to prevent
enemy exploitation of the occupied territories through raids on economic
installations and personnel and through a general terror campaign
waged among the natives. The party agitators were to expand the
party in the rear and prepare a Communist administration to take con-
96 NKVD Document, ok. cit., pp. 7, 65, 66. This data was found in the instruction
notes of a commissar of a brigade. The intelligence role of the bands was heavily
emphasized in the partisan schools.
97
Ibid., 11. 65. The exact date of Ponornarenko's assumption of command is unknown,
but most sources, including WDGS, G-2, place it generally around 1 Aug 42.
98 Nachrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 4, 10.IX.43., OKH/Fde. H. Ost. H 3/738.
This "News of Partisan Warfare" was a periodic summary of all available information
concerning the partisan movement compiled and distributed down to division
level and to the security commands by Foreign Armies East. As such, it constituted
a digest of the best information available to the German command at the time.