the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 151
scattered, and appeared to conform to no set pattern. 15 And when
they did strike, as in the case of the rail bridges in the Bryansk area,
they attempted neither to follow up their advantage nor to exploit the
confusion they created. 16
There is no evidence that the Central Staff intended them to operate
differently. Either too few of them had reached a level of training which
Moscow thought high enough to successfully cope with the German
defenses, or they were deliberately held back for bigger things,
meanwhile operating only extensively enough to keep the Germans close
to their supply axes and out of the partisan concentration areas where
they might interrupt the reorganization still in progress. This latter seems
the more logical explanation, for with the spring muddy season
approaching, which would sharply curtail all movement-German and
Soviet alike-there was little to be gained by operations which were
certain to have few positive results and heavy casualties. All possible
strength would be needed in the summer campaigns ahead, for the Red
Army was sure to continue its heavy attacks all along the line.
Accordingly, the bands appeared to pay more attention to completing
their reorganization and to feeding themselves than to anything else.
They expended much time and energy on drafting and training recruits
to fill out their ranks and form new units, and often gave recruiting
drives precedence over all other activity. 17 In addition, they foraged
extensively. Whereas arms and ammunition were supplied by air from
the Soviet rear, they were expected to live off the land. With their
numbers increasing rapidly, the problem of feeding this force grew
more acute daily, and as the winter wore on they more and more turned
from sabotage to raiding for their own needs. 18
15
201 Sich. Div., Ia, KTB ra, ueber grosse Bandenunternehmungen, DONNER-
KEIL, 21.III.-2.IV.43., Bericht 12.111.43. 38204/2; annex 1 to Bericht des Kdr.
Gen. des Armeegebiets des Pz AOK 2, Nr. 1100/43 geh., Bandenlage Pz AOK 2,
11.VIII.42.-1.VII.43. 37075/91; Feindnachrichtenblatt weber die Bandenlage im
Bereich des Pz AOK 3, Stand: 1.1V.-1.V11.43. 35568/50; order to partisan Bn
Cmdr, Troop No. 00105, signed Burkov, in 213 Sich. Div., Anl. z. KTB, Feindlagenkarten,
16.V.-31.V11.43. 35307/4.
16 See entries for 1 Mar-7 Apr 43 in KTB 3, Band 2, Pz AOK 2, Ia. 1.III.-31.V.43.
37075/12.
17
Feindnachrichtenblatt ueber die Bandenlage irn Bereich des Pz AOK 3, Stand:
2.III.43. in Pz AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. E. z. Tgb. 8, 22.1-30.VI.43. 35568/50;
Bandenlage im Bereich des AOK 16, Februar 43, in AOK 16, Ic, Tgb. Ic/AO z.
KTB 5, Teil VI. 1.1.-31.111.43. 36588/142.
18
Bandenlage, Februar, Mai 43, Pz AOK 2, la, Anl. Bd. 77, 78, 11.V111.43.
37075/90, 37075/91; Bericht, Korueck 532, Ic, Br. Tgb. Nr. 442/43 geh., 30.I.43.,
Feindlage im Korueck-Gebeit, Stand: 26.1.43., Anlagenheft 2, z. KTB Korueck 559
Ia. Unternehmen "KLETTE 2", 5.1.-191.43. 44404/3; Feindnachrichtenblatt
ueber die Bandenlage ins Bereich des Pz AOK 3, Stand: 1.VII.43., in Pz AOK 3,
Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. E. z. Tgb. 8, 22.1.-30.VI.43. 35568/50; Hq. H. Gp. Mitte, la, Nr.
6810/43, 23.VI.43., Anl. z. KTB H. Gp. Mitte, Fuehrungsabt, Akte XXII, Heft 10,
11.V1.-31.V11.43. 65002/22.