the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES 55 Laxity in the Rear The lack of general security consciousness in all the German units heavily accentuated the shortcomings of the security units and made their work increasingly more difficult. The XXXIII Panzer Corps admitted that its troops were "too softhearted and trusting" toward the indigenous population and that as far as 13-14 miles behind the front lines suspicious individuals continually roamed the highways without check.'' Officers often demonstrated extreme carelessness regarding the protection of troop installations. 53 Passes and identification papers were continually counterfeited and successfully used. 54 A number of captured partisans obtained safe conduct passes from local administrative commanders merely by stating that they were liberated Soviet political prisoners. 55 The political commissar of the 1st Partisan Regiment reported to Moscow: "Several of our partisans, when captured by the Germans, identified themselves as escapees from the Russian regime or prisons. After obtaining identification papers from the German headquarteis in Yemilchino in this manner, they reconnoitered the area and returned to the Russian lines." 56 Legal identification papers were issued civilians without termination dates which made it easy for irregulars to use them in carrying on their activities for long periods of time without hindrance; partisan reconnaissance missions became more uniformly successful and messenger service improved when it was discovered that Nazi troops would not stop or harm elderly, well-dressed people. 57 Even after considerable casualties, single vehicles continued on the road and German soldiers still roamed the countryside alone or in groups of only two or three, a condition not ordered corrected until late in September. Even then, convoys continued to travel at night when they were more vulnerable to partisan action. 58 Considerable trust was placed in village elders and mayors who were often informed of impending antipartisan operations and as often passed the information along to irregular groups. The elders were entrusted with the task of collecting all firearms from the people under their jurisdiction and only after some time was it discovered that while 52 Bericht, XXXXIII Pz Corps, Ic, 29.IX.41., Anl. z. KTB, 112 Inf. Div. 19643/24. 53 Gen.St.d.H./Ausb. Abt., Nr. 2200/41 geh., 22.IX.41., Anl. z. KTB, H. Geb. Nord. 14768/3. 54 H. Geb. Nord. Nr. 153/41, q.VIII.41. 14768/5; AOK 18, OQu KTB, 3.VI.- 8.X.41., Anl. 11a, quoting AOK l8, Ic, Nr. 1047/41, 31.VIII.41. 13787/20; H. Geb. Mitte Nr. 51/41, 11.IX.41., in Tgb., Ic, H. Geb. Sued, KTB 1, l.IX.-31.XII.41., Teil 3. 16407/18. 55 Anl. z. KTB, Wi Stab Qst, 16.IX-30.IX.41. Wi/ID 2.345. 56 Tgb., Ic, XXX Corps, 7.X.41. Himmler collection, footlocker 57, folder 15. 57 KTB, 281 Sich. Div., 24.XI.41. 15954/2; Tgb., Ic, H. Geb. Sued, Okt 41, Teil 3 z. KTB 1, H. Geb. Sued, I .IX.-31 .XII.41. 16407/18. 58 KTB, 281 Sich. Div., 19.IX.41. 15954/2.
56 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT the weapons were being collected in many cases they were being handed over to the partisans rather than to the German authorities. 59 Security units were too often committed on the basis of old or unchecked information and mere rumors which led to fruitless dispersion of strength. It was found that the natives often reported the presence of partisans in order to obtain arms. 60 Too often the security troops when occupying a town failed to take a census of the civilian population which made it possible for nonresidents to move freely and enabled Red Army personnel to commit sabotage in civilian clothes. In one instance the failure to check civilians enabled a Russian officer m mufti to penetrate near a high German command post and gain valuable information. The Soviets found that the security 'units occupied only villages and towns located along the main highways, leaving untouched the more remote villages, and ordered these used as partisan strongpoints. 61 It was only after captured Soviet documents indicated that the Rus- - sians had perceived and were exploiting this laxity that measures were taken at high level to correct these deficiencies. Late in September OKH issued a directive calling for stringent measures to be taken by all officers to improve security discipline. 62 Passive Measures by the Army In addition to the uncoordinated and none too aggressive active measures taken by the Germans in the first few weeks of the campaign, a number of more passive attempts were made to check the growth of the partisan movement. In the latter part of July rewards as high as 3,000 rubles ($1,500) were offered to the native population for information leading to the arrest of Soviet insurgents. 63 Apparently the offers brought only meager results, for within two weeks the proffered bribes were changed to threats. On 9 August it was proclaimed in one sector that any person belonging to a partisan formation, any person furnishing aid or comfort, directly or indirectly, to such partisans, or any person withholding information of partisans would be shot. As an afterthought was added the note that anyone furnishing useful intelligence on irregulars would be rewarded with cash and rations. 64 All weapons were ordered turned in and local Russian officials were made responsible for the compliance of the people. After a given deadline, all persons found 59 Bericht, 4/260 Ls. Bn., 30.IX.41., Anl. r. KTB 281 Sich. Div. 15954/2; KTB, 286, Sich. Div., 13.X.41. 16182/3; Anl. 79 z. KTB, 286 Sich. Div., 12.1X.41. 16182/3. 60 KTB 1, H. Geb. Sued, 24.VIII.41. 16407/17. 61 Tgb., Ic, H. Geb. Sued, Okt 41, Teil 3 r. KTB I, H. Geb. Sued, 1.IX--31.XII.41. 16407/18. 62 Gen.St.d.H./Ausb, Abt., Nr. 2200/41 geh., 22.IX.41., Anl. z. KTB, H. Geb. Nord. 14768/3. 63 KTB, H. Geb. Nord. 25.VII.41. 14768/2. 64 HesresfilmstrNe, 9.VIII.41., Struge-Krasnyje. (No file number.) .
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
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Page 22 and 23: Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
Page 24 and 25: PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
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Page 28 and 29: PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
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Page 42 and 43: GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD
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Page 77 and 78: CHAPTER 5 GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIE
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 105 was the
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 107 The Forc
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109 As the p
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 111 This gro
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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Chart 3 ORGANIZATIOUIF A PARTISAN B
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THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT REACHES MATUR
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CHAPTER 10 THE PARTISANS AND THE C
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THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
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PARTISAN CONCENTRATIONS IN SECTOR O
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164 on the rail lines of the centra
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166 Soviet propaganda aimed at the
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY—JUNE
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1
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15 Anl. 43 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 14.
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ARMY GROUP CENTER REAR AREA' WINTER
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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