the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

190 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
border area, and some scattered lootings and dynamiting of public buildings
which the Germans attributed more to Communist Party agents
than to organized partisan action. 24
From the first days of March following the occupation of the positions
along the Baltic States border the quiet in the rear of the sector continued.
There were few bands of any size in evidence except behind the right
flank of the Sixteenth Army in the vicinity of Polotsk and in the woods
in the Opochka area. Even in the region north of Polotsk where the
partisans had once been so strong there was little open opposition. But
there were indications that the bands scattered by Operation HEIN-
RICH, and rescattered in late December, were moving back into the
area south of the Polotsk-Dvinsk rail line and were rebuilding their
strength by recruiting and training. Probing attacks by small antipartisan
units kept many of these on the move, however, and served to
keep the supply lines relatively clear. Still, their mere presence there
constituted a very real threat, especially with the certainty of a continuation
of Red Army attacks with the coming of dry weather. 25
Almost immediately on settling themselves in their new positions 26
the Germans, determined to have no repetition of their experience of
January and February between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, increased
their efforts to neutralize any attempt of the Soviets to build up a new
partisan front behind them. Constantly prodded by army group headquarters
the security commands made good use of the increased number
of security units available following the shortening of the line and the
activation of new native units. They constantly patrolled the supply
axes and probed the wooded areas, meanwhile keeping sharp watch
against infiltration from the Soviet rear. SS-recruited native units destroyed
several hands attempting to enter northern Estonia via Lake
Peipus, one of which included over 200 Red Army officers and enlisted
men apparently intended as cadre personnel for bands to be raised.
To intensify the antipartisan effort, early in April OKH opened a
school for antipartisan warfare for all the armed forces and civilian
agencies in the east. Although the school introduced nothing new in
the way of operations against the bands, the greatest emphasis in the
course was placed on uniformity of method and the utilization of all
possible sources of manpower in case of a widespread irregular outbreak.
During April and May the quiet continued, partisan activity being
restricted to small-scale ambushes in the southern part of the sector and
sporadic forage raids in the center and north. Even behind the Sixteenth
Army where the partisan units were more numerous, there was
24 Anl 240, 344, z. Anl. 42 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 11.I.-13.II.44. 75128/47;
Atli. 498, 617 z. Anl. 43 z. KTB H. Gr. Nord. 14.II.-10.III.44. 75128/48.
25 Anl. 374 z. Anl. 44 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 11.III.-30.IV.44. 75128/49.
26
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is taken from: KTB, H. Gr.
Nord. 1.III.-15.III.44. 75128/38; KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 1.IV.-14.1V.44. 75128/41a.