the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 159
persing the irregulars. 43 FREISCHUETZ was conducted on a considerably
larger scale by the LV Corps. The task force assembled for the
operation, consisting of elements of the Sixth Infantry and Fifth Panzer
Dibisions and a miscellany of security and native volunteer units, had the
mission of enveloping and destroying a group estimated at 4,000 to
6,000 men. The attack was carefully planned as an encirclement to
be launched from blocking lines with phase lines set as limits for each
day's progress. Starting on 21 May and concluded 10 days later, the
operation was considered successful, although the partisans were driven
from the area rather than annihilated. This was due, the task force
commander believed, to the extremely heavy terrain, the weather (which
was rainy throughout), and the relatively small force committed considering
the size of the area to be covered. 44 Before the end of June
1,800 irregulars in three groups were reported back in the area. 45
ZIGEUNERBARON, which had been scheduled for early spring
only to be canceled because of a shortage of troops, was mounted on
16 May 'under the direction of the XLVII Panzer Corps. The task
force comprised elements of three infantry divisions, two panzer divisions,
a Hungarian light division, and a number of security, Ost, and
Volkswehr units, and faced an estimated 6,000 partisans in an extensive
and deeply wooded area which they had had ample time to fortify. The
action was launched as a driving operation with a majority of the task
force units "beating" the area from east to west in an attempt to pin
the bands against the Desna River held as blocking line by the remainder
of the force. It was concluded on 6 June with the bands dispersed but
nowhere destroyed. Partisan casualties were listed as 1,584 killed,
1,568 prisoners, and 869 deserters; 207 camps were destroyed along
with 2,930 bunkers and dugouts. Captured armament included 1,128
small arms. 46
Although the task force command considered the action generally
successful, it attributed the failure to destroy rather than disperse the
bands to the insufficient number of men assigned the operation. The
divisions, each comprising but seven infantry battalions (and these very
probably under strength), had to comb sectors 20 miles wide, despite the
fact that experience had shown that in dense forests and swamps one
43
Bericht, Mai 43, Pz AOK 2, Ia. Anl. Bd. 78, Bandenlage, 11.VIII.42.-1.VII.43.,
37075/91. Stand: 30.V.43., in Bandenlage im Bereich d. Obkds. d. H. Gr. Mitte,
Stand: 28.II.43., Anl. 2, Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43, H. Gr. Mitte.
65003/4.
44
Originally the 10th Div (mot) and a reinforced regiment of the 31st Div had
been assigned to the force, but were pulled off at the last minute.
45
Stand: 30.1V.43., 30.V.43., 30.V11.43., Bandenlage Bereich d. Obkds. d. H.
Gr. Mitte, Stand: 28.11.43., Anl. 2, Bandenlisten, Februar bis September 43, H. Gr.
Mitte. 65003/4; H. Gr. Mitte, Abt. Ia. Anl. 2 z. KTB, Bericht Ueber Unternehmen
FREISCHUETZ, Juni—Juli 43, Gen. Kdo, LV AK, Abt., Ia. Nr. 1560/43 geh. v,
7.V.1.43. 65002/28.
46
Gen. Kdo. XXXXVII Pz Korps, Ia. Nr. 2100/43 geh., 2.VII.43., in Pz AOK 2,
Ia. Anl. Bd. 47. 7 .V.-4.VI.43 ZIGEUNERBARON. 37075/60.