the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

182 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
over the rail lines and one primary highway, the Dvinsk-Pskov-Luga-
Leningrad. The secondary net consisted of unimproved roads and
trails.
The Offensive Against the Eighteenth Army
The 13,000-odd partisans in the Eighteenth Army sector were rather
evenly distributed on either side of the Pskov-Luga-Leningrad railroad
and highway, with the heaviest concentrations just west of Lake Ilmen
and Novogorod and south of the Narva-Gatchina rail line.' The army
saw this latter concentration as the greatest danger to its rear should the
Soviets launch a full-dress offensive. Since the beginning of the war
the bands had remained in the swamp wastes east of Lake Peipus, lying
undisturbed and free to develop as they wished, and since early January
the army had been looking for the means to clear them out. No concern
was expressed over the bands grouped west of Lake Ilmen.8
On 14 January the Red Army launched its drive to free Leningrad
and clear the area between the lakes, striking with a two-pronged attack
out of the Gulf of Finland beachhead and across the ice on Lake Ilmen
below Novogorod. Following on the heels of the Army in a series of
closely coordinated moves, the bands descended on selected sections of
the German lines of communication.
The offensive seemed to have been planned as a double envelopment to
trap the Eighteenth Army against the Russian defenses before Leningrad
and the Volkhov River, with the bands complementing the attack by
interdicting the principal north-south traffic axes. This latter would not
only make a withdrawal by the Germans doubly difficult, but would cut
them off from reinforcement and resupply and at the same time cover
the exposed Soviet left flank.
The partisans struck after the initial assaults of the regular units when
the situation had become somewhat clarified and the necessity for security
had passed. By thus delaying their attacks, they induced the Germans,
in the face of the heavy Russian assaults, to commit many of their
security units in the front lines almost immediately, leaving sizeable
portions of the rear undefended.
Contrary to German expectations, the partisans concentrated south of
the Narva-Gatchina railroad made no major effort to disrupt the
immediate rear of the divisions defending against the northern wing of
the
Red Army drive. Rather, almost directly after the attack started,
6 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is taken from KTB, H.
Gr. Nord, 12.1.-28.1.44., 24.1.-31.1.44., 1.11.-10.11.44. 75128/31, 32, 34.
7 Bandenlage, Dez. 43, H. Gr. Nord, le/AO, KTB, Bandenlagekarten Dez. 43. 75131/41.
8
See entries for 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 Jan 44 in KTB, H. Gr. Nord, la, 1.1.-11.1.44.
75128/30.