the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1944 193
mitted some of his units in the front line alongside Red Army organizations.
Others he sent against the rail lines radiating out of Kovel.
Federov operated farther to the south, having moved across the Soviet
rear and through the front line via a gap between the German XIII and
LIX Corps. He was under orders to set up his base of operations in
the Gaisin area some 60 miles southwest of Vinnitsa with the mission
of developing a partisan concentration area there and working against
German communications. Naumov moved into the Tarnopol region
and began to operate against the Lwow-Odessa railroad. All three bands
were reported well armed with light artillery and automatic weapons
and to have Red Army officers among their officer personnel. Several
other bands were identified in the line alongside the Russian I and VI
Guards Corps opposite the Fourth Panzer Army. Additional units were
occasionally reported operating exclusively against the Ukrainian nationalist
organizations, others were recruiting civilians for the Red Army
ranks and waging local terror campaigns to dissuade the natives from
working for the Germans on their defensive positions.
Taken all in all, the efforts of these groups had little effect on German
operations. During February in the rear of the Fourth Panzer Army,
which was holding the most critical sector of the line, they carried out
but 49 raids, clashed with security units 65 times, and set demolitions on
the rail lines at but 113 places.
With the fight moving south and west into the sub-Carpathians and
Galicia, the various groups of anti-Soviet Ukrainian separatists, organizations
again came into the picture, but without visible effect on the tactical
situation. Many of these groups appeared hesitant to declare their
sympathies, seeming content to await developments at the front. Although
some had their doubts as to the efficacy of opposing the highriding
Soviets, all of them appear to have had one common goal, the
expulsion of all ethnic Poles from the Ukrainian nationalist stronghold
in Galicia. One group, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska
Porstancha Armia _ UPA) attacked the partisans almost as soon as they
moved in from the northeast, and suffered such heavy losses initially
that it was forced to withdraw from the picture for a time. One unconfirmed
rumor had the UPA ordering several of its smaller units into
the Soviet rear to attack Red Army communications.
During this period the Soviets made a curious move in an attempt to
undermine a part of the German security command. Behind the left
flank of Army Group South and the extreme southern wing of Army
Group Center there were elements of nine Hungarian security divisions
in two corps. The morale and combat efficiency of these units was low
and the Germans consistently felt that they could be counted on for little
effective action, even against the partisans. Perhaps knowing this and
hoping to even further lower their fighting spirit and induce them to