the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

158 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
below there were few illusions as to the possibility of regaining the
initiative with Operation ZITADELLE or even of conducting a sucensive
along the front as it then stood. The lines of communication
thus assumed added importance as routes of withdrawal,
and the possibility of their loss at the same time the Soviets were attacking
was a very real danger.
The answer was obvious: the concentrations had to be broken up and
scattered by a series of large-scale offensive strikes by first-line forces
prior. to any moves by the Red Army." Here the Germans faced a
dilemma. Antipartisan operations such as they had mounted during
the winter could never hold the bands should they strike with their full
strength, and, with the summer battles impending, they could not spare
the manpower to clear the whole rear or even a good portion of it.
Again they would have to do what they could with what they had,
that is, make a concerted effort to clear at least temporarily the rear
of the most critical point in the line, the Bryansk-Orel sector, where
the first Soviet blow seemed sure to fall, and let the rest go for the
present.
Accordingly, when a postponement of ZITADELLE gave promise of
the loan of several line divisions, plans for clearing the entire Bryansk
region with a series of offensive sweeps were drawn up for execution in
late May and June. Priority was given to Operations FREISCHUETZ
and OSTEREI, the actions north of Bryansk designed to secure the
rear of the more thinly held northern flank of the Second Panzer Army.
Operation ZIGEUNERBARON, projected to clear a large pocket south
of Bryansk between the Desna River and the Bryansk-Lgov railroad
which had been extremely active during the winter, was to follow.
Operation NACHBARHILFE was to be another attempt to eliminate
an exceptionally strong concentration between the Bryansk-Roslavl and
Bryansk-Gomel rail lines. A smaller operation, TANNHAEUSER, was
planned to eliminate a troublesome pocket southeast of Pochep on the
Bryansk-Gomel line."
OSTEREI and FREISCHUETZ were launched almost simultaneously.
The former, a relatively small-scale action by security units alone,
had as its mission the destruction of an especially active partisan battalion
of some 600 to 700 men just to the north and east of Bryansk which had
been blocking the Bryansk-Dudorovsky rail line, a feeder link used to
supply LV Corps. The mission was accomplished to the extent of dis-
41 See entry for 7 Apr 43, in Pz AOK 2, Ia, KTB 3, Bd. 2, 1.III.-31.V.43. 37075/12.
42
See: H. Gr. Mitte/Ia. 4875/43 g.K. Chefs. z. OKH, 7.V.43., H. Gr. Mitte/Ia
Anl. z. KTB. Besondere Bandenunternehmungen, Mai—Juni 43. 65002/26.