the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell
the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell
the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell
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72 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT<br />
a census of <strong>the</strong> population in which all individuals not native to <strong>the</strong><br />
place were to be shown with <strong>the</strong> date of <strong>the</strong>ir arrival. These lists were<br />
to be constantly checked <strong>by</strong> means of snap roll calls. Collective punitive<br />
measures were to be carried out for noncompliance of orders. Natives<br />
were forbidden to travel from one village to ano<strong>the</strong>r and no one was to be<br />
allowed to leave his community except in exceptional cases and <strong>the</strong>n<br />
only with <strong>the</strong> permission of <strong>the</strong> garrison commander. Permits for such<br />
travel were to be dated and bear <strong>the</strong> route and <strong>the</strong> place to be visited,<br />
and were to be valid for but one day. All permits were to be turned in<br />
on <strong>the</strong> date of expiration and any person found on <strong>the</strong> roads without<br />
a pass was to be arrested and, if not belonging to <strong>the</strong> nearest village,<br />
executed as a <strong>partisan</strong>. 56<br />
Effect of <strong>the</strong> Manpower Shortage in <strong>the</strong> Rear<br />
Even with this increased awareness on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> Army High<br />
Command of <strong>the</strong> turn events in <strong>the</strong> occupied areas and <strong>the</strong> improved<br />
procedures for dealing with it, <strong>the</strong> efforts to establish secure control of<br />
<strong>the</strong> rear left much to be desired and did little to retard <strong>the</strong> growth of <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>movement</strong>. This was due primarily to <strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> people. Even<br />
<strong>the</strong> victory at Vyazma in October only momentarily stayed a steady<br />
deterioration of public morale and a growing hostility toward <strong>the</strong> Germans.<br />
The reasons were always <strong>the</strong> same-fear of a Soviet return, <strong>the</strong><br />
German failure to improve <strong>the</strong> food situation, and, as ever, <strong>the</strong> land<br />
tenure question. In <strong>the</strong> central and nor<strong>the</strong>rn sectors <strong>the</strong> individual<br />
Russian more and more was coming to look on <strong>the</strong> German as an enemy,<br />
not as a "liberator." As a result he became obstinate and disrespectful,<br />
and began to support <strong>the</strong> <strong>partisan</strong>s, tacitly if not openly. The unchecked<br />
"clearing” actions of <strong>the</strong> Einsatzgruppen and police units, during<br />
which many people were executed without proof of Communist<br />
Party affiliation or Jewish blood, hurt <strong>the</strong> German cause immensely, and<br />
<strong>the</strong> continued pilfering and illegal requisitioning <strong>by</strong> <strong>the</strong> troops, especially<br />
that of <strong>the</strong> security units, did nothing to improve <strong>the</strong> situation. 57<br />
In <strong>the</strong>se matters <strong>the</strong>re was little <strong>the</strong> security commands could do. As<br />
far as feeding <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> devastated areas, <strong>the</strong>y faced <strong>the</strong> hard and<br />
fast policies of <strong>the</strong> economic administration, and when some limited<br />
food stocks were available <strong>the</strong>re was insufficient transportation for<br />
equitable distribution. There was no chance for a practical psychological<br />
approach with OKW refusing to allow <strong>the</strong> Wehrmacht Propaganda<br />
Division to make any open commitments on any subject; as a result many<br />
56<br />
12 Inf. Div., Ic/Ia, Nr. 607/41. 17.XI.41. in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,<br />
op. cit., VII, pp: 49-51.<br />
57<br />
Bericht, Wi Stab Sued, 16.X.41. Wi/ID 2.1355; Lagebericht, Ortskdtr<br />
"Rshev'', 8.XI.41., in KTB, Korueck 582. 17326/11; Anl. 12 z. Lagebericht, Wi Stab<br />
"Krasnowardeisk," Okt 41. Wi/ID 2.189.