the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD DEBACLE 41 a projected assault on Leningrad, and given a newly formed task force designated Army Group Don with the specific mission of breaking through and relieving Paulus. With the Romanian divisions that had escaped the trap and five armored and motorized divisions hastily brought from as far away as France he attacked toward Stalingrad along the Kotelnikov-Stalingrad axis. But the Soviet armies were too well in command of, the situation and the attempt fell short. The Sixth Army with its 250,000 men was doomed. Although Hitler had ordered Paulus to hold at all costs, he saw the folly of attempting to remainin the Caucasus Accordingly he ordered Von Kleist to withdrawthe Seventeenth Army to the Crimea and the First Panzer Army to the Ukraine through Rostov. With Von Manstein fighting desperately to hold open an escape gap for Von Kleist at the mouth of the Don and with Paulus hanging on to a steadily diminishing perimeter in the face of tremendous pressure, the withdrawal was successfully completed. ' Only on 2 February when the evacuation through Rostov had been completed did Paulus capitulate.
CHAPTER 4 EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES The initial German attack in June 1941 was hardly under way before the first signs of guerrilla-like opposition appeared. There was no question of a popular rising: the mass of the people had no part in it. It consisted in the main of the continued resistance of groups of bypassed Red Army personnel, some scattered demolitions by small groups of saboteurs parachuted or infiltrated into the German rear, and the activity of hastily formed units of Communist Party members and officials of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) directed toward maintaining some sort of political control over the natives or completing the destruction initiated by the Red Army in its "scorched earth" policy. The First Resistance Bypassed Red Army Units Of the groups offering the earliest opposition, the bypassed Red Army units posed the most immediate problem because for the most part they were still armed and in many cases retained some semblance of military organization. Tens of thousands of such personnel were scattered over the rear in troop units of all sizes: and while huge numbers were taken prisoner the nature of the terrain was such, especially in the central and northern sectors and to some extent on the left flank of Army Group South that the final elimination of all of their many small centers of resistance proved well nigh impossible. The task, which would have been difficult for even the first-line infantry units in the face of difficult and relatively unmapped terrain and inadequate intelligence, became almost insurmountable for the security divisions and police battalions that took over the job as the fighting moved further to the east. The expanse of territory to be covered was too great an obstacle, and many enemy units remained--a sizeable reservoir of manpower to harass communications. Even as early as the first days of July their stubborn resistance to mopping up operations created many critical situations, and pockets continued to appear far to the rear as late 1 Teil 2, KTB 1, H.Geb. Sued, 21.VI.--31.VIII.41. 16407/17. 42
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
Page 6 and 7: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
Page 9: PREFACE The purpose of this text is
Page 12 and 13: viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
Page 14 and 15: x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
Page 16 and 17: 2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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Page 22 and 23: Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
Page 24 and 25: PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
Page 26 and 27: PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
Page 28 and 29: PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
Page 30 and 31: PREINVASION PLANNING 15 limited obj
Page 32 and 33: PREINVASION PLANNING 17 and philoso
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Page 36 and 37: PREINVASION PLANNING 21 torates, on
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GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
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Chapter 6 THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 99 The commo
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 101 lective
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 103 Religion
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 105 was the
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 107 The Forc
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109 As the p
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 111 This gro
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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Chart 3 ORGANIZATIOUIF A PARTISAN B
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THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT REACHES MATUR
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CHAPTER 10 THE PARTISANS AND THE C
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THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1
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PARTISAN CONCENTRATIONS IN SECTOR O
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164 on the rail lines of the centra
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166 Soviet propaganda aimed at the
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY—JUNE
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THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1
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15 Anl. 43 z. KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 14.
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ARMY GROUP CENTER REAR AREA' WINTER
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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