the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

194 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
defect as units, the Soviet high command sometime after the first of the
year issued a directive to both the Red Army and those partisan organizations
currently in the area that the Hungarian units were not to be
attacked. If fired on by them, the Soviets were to bypass them and
return fire only if faced with unusually strong and persistent resistance. 37
As far as is known, no such order regarding the Romanian units with
the Wehrmacht was ever issued.
By the end of March, there was evidence of a considerable increase in
the size of several partisan units and of a much closer tie-in of their
operations with those of the Red Army. Four bands totaling some
8,000-9,000 men and united under a central command appeared in the
rear of the Fourth Panzer Army, which was defending in theTarnopol-
Lwow area where the Soviet pressure was very heavy, carrying out tactical
reconnaissance for the Red Army, attempting to prevent the destruction
of important traffic installations by the retreating Germans, and
striking at the supply lines. When the fighting moved in on Tarnopol,
this force moved to the south, possibly to aid the Red Army in its attempt
to destroy the First Panzer Army which had been surrounded and was
attempting to fight its way out to the west.
In April the Naumov band, grown to some 1,500-2,000 men, reappeared,
now operating against the rail line running east from Lwow.
Due to the large number of German troops in the area, however, they
had little success, and were continually badgered in their operations by
UPA units, which had increased considerably in size and had grown
very aggressive. A miscellany of a number of smaller bands was equally
ineffective.
In May the Red Army pressure eased somewhat and the Germans
were able to move more actively against these bands in a series of local
actions. These combined with the growing strength of the UPA, which
now fighting in its avowed homeland was successfully recruiting increasing
numbers of native Galicians into its ranks, and the logistical difficulties
the partisans were having because the number of Germans in the
area precluded adequate supply by air drop, gradually scattered the
remaining bands. Thus the partisan movement in the south, which
had never been a factor in the fight there, faded out of the picture.
The Final Blow—The Central Sector
The Realignment of Partisan Strength
Before the end of January it had become obvious that the start the
partisans in the central sector had made toward expanding and con­
37
Rpt, GM) 704, quoted in memo, Abt. Frd.H.Ost, 16.11.44., Frd.H.Ost,
Vortraege and Notizen. H 3/193.