the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

12 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
field army. Besides the planning and organization of supply in the
field, he was responsible for the establishment and security of all lines
of communication and supply installations and for military government
control of the areas behind the operating armies. 12
By the time detailed planning for BARBAROSSA was well under
way following the December publication of the actual directive for the
attack, the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht--OKW) had made it clear that the occupation of the
Soviet Union was to be civilian and political, not military, and had
placed definite limitations on the extent to which a strictly military
jurisdiction was to be exercised. The area under the control of the
Army was to be kept as shallow as possible, and as the campaign moved
farther and farther to the east the forward boundary of the political
administration zone, which was to be established behind the Army's
zone of operations, was to be progressively advanced. With the termination
of hostilities the entire area was to go under a political occupation.
13 In other words, a planned administration was to be put into
effectin the occupied portions of the USSR only after they had left the
jurisdiction of the military.
With the policy thus set, GenQu made his preparations accordingly,
planning only those security measures necessary to guarantee the unimpeded
progress of the armies and the exploitation of the land for their
immediate use. 14
The Security Commands
In March GenQu received his allotment of staffs and troop units.
These comprised three army group rear headquarters (Rueckwaertige
Heeresgebiete) and nine security divisions (Sicherungs Divisionen) activated
from three regular infantry divisions. These security divisions
were units "specially created," as OKH described them, to handle the
security, exploitation, and military administration" behind the front
lines. One army group rear area headquarters and three security di-
12
TM E 30-351, "Handbook on German Military Forces" (1945) ;"Versorgung
des Feldheeres," op. cit., pp. 12-15. The information in these sources was corrected
and brought up to date by Gen Maj Alfred Toppe, GenQu during 1944-45, in
interview in Aug 52.
13
See: Helmuth Greiner, "Draft Entries in the War Diary of Def Br [Definite
Branch] of Wehrmacht Operations (Dec 40-Mar 21)" (MS 065k, Hist Div,
EUCOM), pp. 102--04. Copy in Foreign Studies Br, OCMH. Supplement to
Directive 21, "Directive for Special Areas (Operation BARBAROSSA )," OKW/
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu), Nr. 44125/41 g.K.Chefs., 13.III.41., in "Fuehrer Directives,"
op. cit., I, pp. 15860.
14
"Special Directives for the Supply," 3 Apr 41, in Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals (hereafter cited as N.M.T.), V, U.S. vs
Wilhelm von Leeb, et al (Case 12), von Roques 2. Copy in CRS, TAG.