the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

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168 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT lines continued to be the hardest hit in the whole central sector, the former suffering 643 demolitions in one 30 mile stretch between Zhlobin and Bobruysk, the latter 580 in 40 miles. 81 Travel between Gomel and Zhlobin finally became so difficult that the Germans, in a desperate attempt to curb the raids, unloaded replacements along that particular stretch and placed them at 20 foot intervals as static track guards. Yet the demolitions continued. 82 For several days following the mass demolitions of 18-19 September, the majority of which occurred in the Pripyat west of Gomel, the rail traffic situation in the vicinity of that city was quite critical. Due to the large number of track breaks caused by the bands and raids by the Red Air Force and the unusually great traffic demands occasioned by the withdrawal, 130 evacuation trains became blocked in the marshalling yards there with the Red Army attacking but a few miles to the east. The failure of the bands to follow up their first assaults prior to 25-26 September, however, gave the transportation command an opportunity to bring the situation under control, and none of the 130 was lost. 83 OKH became so worried over these continued demolitions in the Pripyat area that Foreign Armies East for a while seriously considered entering the radio nets of the bands there and simulating orders from Moscow to halt the attacks. The Germans were very familiar with the partisan nets and had monitored their traffic for some time. The plan was finally dropped, however, in the fear that the bands might discover the subterfuge and alter their codes and procedures and thus deny the German command a valuable source of intelligence. 84 As the withdrawal progressed, the bands were gradually forced westward into new areas by the retreating Gemans. But they went reluctantly, in some cases forcing Wehrmacht units to fight their way back to the new positions. 85 By 1 October the Germans had occupied their Dnepr line, and the pressure of the Red Army attacks began to ease as the Soviets paused to regroup. During September the transportation command successfully moved a total of 2,029 trains in the central sector, 713 of them evacuation trains. This brought the total of rail movements since the opening of 81 Bandenanschlaege im Monat Sept. 43, Ani. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, Ia. Nr 11822/43 g.Kdos. 17,143. 65002/24; Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)," p. 15. MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH. 82 Teske, op. cit., p. 197. 83 Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)," p. 15. MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH. 84 Funktaeuschung der Banden, Fde. Ion Ost (I/Bd), Nr. 2488/43 g.Kdos., 4.X.43 H 3/193. 85 Be f ehl, Hq, AOK 2, 1.X.43. 60311/21.
169 ZITADELLE to 7,912. 86 During the same period the partisans had successfully set off some 21,348 rail demolitions in more than 26,000 attempts, in addition to other extensive sabotage. In spite of these efforts and the tremendous pressure exerted by the Red Army, the Germans had executed their two successive withdrawal movements on schedule, with a minimum loss of troop and supply trains, and at all times under their own control. 87 The Northern and Southern Sectors During the Summer and Fall In the northern sector the partisans were not overly active. Due to the more stable situation along the front there, the rear area commands had not been weakened by withdrawals of security units for service in the line and were generally able to hold them in check by constant patrolling and occasional raids. 88 In the rear of the Sixteenth Army sabotage activity, especially on the rail lines, increased somewhat during August in connection with the Soviet assaults on the Staraya-Russa front, but never assumed any such proportions as behind Army Group Center. Although the partisans there set some chain demolitions, using as many as several hundred mines on occasion, the fact that their units were small and not well established in the area precluded their exercising any real effect on the tactical situation. 89 A similar situation existed in the rear of the Eighteenth Army between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus.90 During September the partisans broke rails at but 81 places and damaged but 7 bridges in the whole sector, in addition to some small-scale raiding and pillaging and occasional clashes with security patrols. 91 Under the surface of this comparative quiet, however, lay a definite threat for the future. All during the summer the natives in the sector had been growing increasingly hostile to the occupation, and by September they were no longer cooperating in reporting raids or the whereabouts of partisans. This deprived the security commands of a valuable source of information. To cap this, the bands were steadily growing in 86 See: Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943)," pp. 14, 16-17. MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH . 87 Ibid.; H. Gr, Mitte, Ia. Nr, 11822/43 g. Kdos., 17.X.43., Anl. z. KTB. H. Gr. Mitte, Fuehrungsabt., Akte XXIII, Heft 12, 1.X.-31.XII.43 . 65002/24; see also: Lagen Ost for the period. 88 Bandenlage, Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage, OKH/Fde. H. Ost (I), 1.IX.– 31.X.43. H 3/204; Bericht, September 43, AOK 16, Ia. KTB 5, Teil VII, Banden akten, 1.VII-31.XII.43. 44185/69. 89 89 Bericht, August 43, AOK 16, Ia. KTB 5, Teil VII, Banden- akten, 1.VII.– 31.XII.43. 44185/69. 90 Banden, Sept. 43. in H. Cr. Nord. Ic/AO, KTB Bandenlagekarten, Jan. bis Sept. 43. 75131/40; 285 Sich. Div., Anl. z. KTB 3, Ic. u. IIa, 1.II.-30.VI.43., 1.VII. 31.XII.43. 35155/4, 43060/4. 91 H. Gr. Nord, Ic/AO, KTB, Bandenlagekarten, Jan. bis Sep 43. 75131/40.
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F I N L A N D Kholrn MOSCOW S. R. A
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 2
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PREFACE The purpose of this text is
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viii PART TWO . 1941-1942: THE PERI
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x PART THREE. 1943-1944: THE PERIOD
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2 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Euro
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4 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT Whit
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6 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT mile
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Map 3. Period of German Offensives,
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PREINVASION PLANNING 9 Still doubti
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PREINVASION PLANNING 11 Chart 1 - O
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PREINVASION PLANNING 13 visions wer
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PREINVASION PLANNING 15 limited obj
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PREINVASION PLANNING 17 and philoso
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PREINVASION PLANNING 19 district Ko
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PREINVASION PLANNING 21 torates, on
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PREINVASION PLANNING 23 world revol
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PREINVASION PLANNING 25 sions, of w
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GERMAN OPERATIONS TO THE STALINGRAD
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EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN
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CHAPTER 5 GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIE
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GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERA
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Chapter 6 THE OCCUPATION FALTERS
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 99 The commo
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 101 lective
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 103 Religion
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 105 was the
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 107 The Forc
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109 As the p
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 111 This gro
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 113 . The Pa
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THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 115 tected b
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THE GERMANS CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 11
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Page 139 and 140: F N L A N O Map 4. Period of Soviet
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212 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT me
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The Soviet Pa
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 217 United Sta
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