the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

142 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
The Bands as Intelligence Organs
Although in1942 a start had been made toward utilizing the bands as
information-gathering agencies, little was actually accomplished in this
regard prior to the completion of the reorganization in the spring of
1943. Withthe establishment of the partisan staffs and operating groups
within the Red Army field commands and with the operations groups in
over-all command of irregular units behind the German lines, both
RO andOONKVD 15 sections were attached to the various partisan staffs
[see chart 4], down to and including brigades, to control all Soviet
intelligence activities in the occupied areas. Generally the assignment
of these sections was espionage for the Red Army and for the party
committees in the immediate sector; reconnaissance in line with combat
missions and the security of bases and installations; and political espionage
for the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow.
To guide and control this work, a deputy chief for Reconnaissance and
Information was attached to each operations group, and manuals such
as a "Guide for Political Espionage" and a "Guide Book for the Partisan
Intelligence Agent," were issued to the lower echelons. 16 A supplement
to the latter covered in detail the scope of the information
desired, both military and political. It contained altogether 172 questions
in 21 fields and covered almost every aspect of the situation in
the German-occupied areas. From German occupation agencies and
administrative measures to native working and living conditions, edution,
religion, public health, and political attitude, the list went on to
Wehrmacht morale, antipartisan measures and tactics, organization of
native police, and a very detailed list on German use of native troops,
including nationalities involved, social and economic background,
methods of recruiting, inducements offered, morale, and political attitude.
17 The brigade RO's and the commissars of the smaller bands
worked to provide answers to these questions through local agent informer
nets they set up and through de-briefing sessions with the partisans
themselves following an operation. Missions assigned to the
bands were often dual-purpose. A brigade working opposite the Leningrad
Front received orders to set demolitions along a specified section
of rail line, attack an outlying enemy air field, and reconnoiter for
German troop strength and dispositions, all in the same mission. 18
15
Ossobyj Odtel-NKVD intelligence, i. e. Soviet counterintelligence.
16
Anl. 9 z. "Nachrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 3," OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Abt. Frde
H. Ost (I/Bd), Nr. 5632/43 g. Kdos., 28.VII.43. H 3/748; Anl. 3 z. "Nachrichten
ueberBandenkrieg,Nr 1"; "NachrichtenueberBandenkrieg, Nr. 4," OKH/Gen.
St.d.H./Abt. Frde. H. Ost. H 3/738.
17
Annex 1 to "Nachrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 4," OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Abt.
Frde. H. Ost. H 3/738.
18
Captured partisan order in Anl.3 z. "Nachtrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 1,"
OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Abt. Frde Heere Ost,3 May 43.H 3/738.