the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

54 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
required for success against an irregular foe. They were woefully short
of motor vehicles, and those available to them were in a poor state of
repair; 47 they rarely had enough gasoline or other types of supplies; 48
the personnel, being for the most part from the Landwehr classifications
(35 to 45 years old), were proving poorly equipped physically for antipartisan
work. 49
From an operational standpoint the level of efficiency of the security
divisions left a great deal to be desired. Due to the failure of OKH to
prepare for an irregular rising, they were badly handicapped from the
start by a lack of understanding of partisan resistance and training in
methods of combating it. The operational directives issued them prior
to the campaign had been drawn up without any clear conception of
the type of warfare they were to face and were too generalized for poorly
staffed, relatively untrained units. General missions and responsibilities
had been outlined in these directives, but methodology was left completely
to the discretion and initiative of the individual commanders.
Initially, this lack of direction resulted at times in a "wild state of
anarchy" in antipartisan operations and the unnecessary killing of numbers
of innocent civilians. Coordination of effort was lacking and there
was little or no interchange or pooling of information even among units
of the same parent organization. Operations varied sharply according
to the character of the commanders of the individual units and the
qualities of the troops. 50
At best their tactical employment was desultory. Because of the expanse
of country which had to be covered, they took positive measures
against the partisans only when the supply lines and installations were
openly threatened. Even then they stuck closely to the roads and rail
lines and the urban areas, and avoided the more difficult terrain and
back-country regions. Seeing little of the growing opposition, unaware
of or indifferent to the possibility of a developing pattern of hostility in
the rear, and victorious in a few insignificant incidents over small insurgent
groups, the security units gained in confidence and foresaw an early
advent of complete peace and quiet there. They felt they were winning
their war and that their areas of responsibility would be completely under
control in a matter of weeks or days. 51
47
KTB, 213 Sich. Div., 31 .VIII.41. 14424/2.
48
KTB, 281 Sich. Div., 14.VII.41. 15954/6; Anl. 77 z. KTB 221 Sich. Div.,
15.VIII.41. 16748/24.
49
"Final Report on Combating Partisans and Parachutists Along the Slucz River,
213th Security Division," 31 Aug 41. 1442412.
50
Bericht, Korueck 582,27.IX.41. 17262/11; I.M.T., op. cit., IV, pp. 479-80.
51
Anl. Z. KTB, AOK 16,19.VII.41. 35615/2; rpt, Economic Office at Smolensk,
3-16 September 41. Wi/ID 2.319.