the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

68 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
sonnel took active command, leaving the party members only political
functions, these units took on something of a military tinge, becoming
more active and their operations more uniformly successful. 40
To combat the partisans the security commands evolved an antipartisan
blueprint founded on the basic assumption that to be successful in
a rear area war they had to be as mobile and as tricky as the partisans
themselves, so much so that it would be the Germans who were feared,
not the partisans. Highest priority was given to obtaining accurate and
up-to-date information of the bands as to location, strength, composition,
armament, mission, etc., in order to obviate faulty or scattered
commitment of security forces. The establishment of a reliable net
of informers from the civil population-Vertrauensleute or V men-in
each area was considered an absolute must. All information brought in
by these V men was to be immediately evaluated and checked for
accuracy, and all false or overexaggerated reports punished severely.
High emphasis was placed on aggressiveness and general alertness.
Frontal assaults in difficult county had proved abortive, too often
splitting the enemy units into groups small enough to slip through the
lines of the attacking force. Mobility and surprise rather than superiority
of force were believed to be the best guarantee of success, since
the majority of the bands were still small. The alert regiments and SS
brigades therefore were to be re-formed into highly mobile task forces
of several companies each and held in constant readiness at strategic
points. Roads and rail line right of ways were to be patrolled continuously
in order to maintain pressure on the bands and keep them off
balance. Surprise offensive operations of ample strength were to be
executed in such a way that they would be unable to escape annihilation.
Where a composite force of German military and paramilitary units
was to be committed, a clear chain of command and responsibility was
to be established prior to the action. The troops of the Landesschuetzen
battalions and any spare police forces were to be dispersed down to
platoon size over as many villages as possible so as to give support to the
inhabitants against the terror raids, deny the partisans bases and food,
and prevent the natives from aiding them. Once an area was considered
pacified, it was still to be patrolled and important localities and installations
guarded. Native volunteer units, wherever recruited, were to be
used for reconnaissance and static guard duty only, and never committed
in an offensive operation except as a last resort, and then under close
and immediate German command. The areas surrounding important
depots and rail junctions were to be evacuated of all natives, although
it was realized that such a move would not necessarily allow for a reduction
of the security garrison there; admittedly rail lines and highways,
even when guarded and patrolled, would still be vulnerable to attack.
40
Meldung 97 Einsatzgruppe B, 28.IX.41. 62/5.