the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE OCCUPATION FALTERS 109
As the program continued with its devastating effect on popular
morale, the occupation administration began to feel the over-all effect
more and more acutely. The economic program was especially hard hit
by the rise in partisan activity? Rosenberg became concerned about
the effect on his occupational set-up and remonstrated sharply with
Sauckel. The large increase in the bands, he wrote, was largely due
to the methods of procuring laborers, the result of which could only be a
strengthening of the number and fighting spirit of the irregulars and a
danger to all German activities in the eastern areas. 54
Despite the obviously harmful consequences of the draft, the quotas
were raised even higher, 225,000 being demanded from the Ukraine
alone between 5 October and 31 December, and 225,000 more by 1
May 1943. 55 To aid in the draft, the labor officials began calling up
workers by age groups, both male and female. With this intensification
rather than mitigation of the program, it became more and more obvious
that the ruling group in Berlin was completely unaware of the rocks
onto which this blind policy was driving the entire eastern war effort.
Treatment of Prisoners of War 56
The German treatment of Red Army prisoner of war also exercised
a deep and lasting effect on the entire Soviet defense effort. It only
indirectly touched the natives and influenced them to no such degree
as the land reform question which for decades had been their end-all
in life. But it did serve to substantiate Communist propaganda, their
disappointment and disgust with "liberation” policies, and it heightened
and drove them even further away from the "liberators." The effect
on the will of the Red Army to resist and the growth of the partisan
movement was much greater.
The German position regarding the treatment to be accorded prisoners
of war was clear and explicit: "The regulations of the Hague Rules of
Land Warfare .. . are not valid since the USSR is dissolved." 57
". . . [therefore] the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners
53
For the effect on the economic program, see: "Report on the Effects of the
Partisan Situation," 30 Jun 43, in Ibid.
54
Der Reichminister fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete [Rosenberg] an den Gaubiter
Fritz Sauckul, 21.XII.42., Nr. 02926/42, in Facharbeitersammellager Charkow an
Bfh. Heeresgebiet B., Abt. VII, betref, Uebelstaen& in der Behandlung ukrainischer
Facharbeiter, 15.IX.42., in I.M.T., ob. cit., XXV, pp. 74-79.
55
Der Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer den Arbeitseinsatr [Sauckel] an den Herrn
Reichsminister fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete [Rosenberg], VA Nr. 5780.28/4265,
3.X.42., in ibid., pp. 72-73.
56
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is taken from: Rosenberg an
den Herrn Chef des Oberkommandos des Wehrmacht, betr.: Kriegsgefangene 28.II.
42.,inI.M.T., op. cit.,XXV,pp. 156-61.
57 Erster Abschmitt: Die Organisation der Verwaltung in den besetzten Ostgebieten
in I.M.T., op. cit., XXVI, pp. 592-609.