the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

124 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
the Don and the Donets. These two springboards placed the Russians
in an excellent position to continue their assault after Von Kleist's escape
through Rostov. Keeping the offensive rolling, they continued the
attack both north and southeast of Kharkov. On 5 February Vatutin
crossed the Donets in heavy force in the Izyum area, and before the
middle of the month cut the main rail lines running into the Donets bend
area and forced Von Manstein to withdraw westward to the old Mius
River positions. Farther to the north Golikov captured Kursk on 7
February and then swung to the south and took Belgorod two days
later. Continuing, he pushed further south toward the rear of Kharkov
while Vatutin attacked the city from the east and south. The city fell
on 16 February, breaking the entire German position on the upper
Donets. The situation of the Wehrmacht appeared precarious with the
Russians threatening to go clear to the Dnepr and trap all German forces
east of the river.
At this point, however, the Russian attack slowed almost to a stop.
The Soviets' communications lines were badly overstretched and their
front in the south had almost doubled in length. This combined with a
sudden unseasonal thaw served to give the Germans a breathing spell and
an opportunity to consolidate their defensive positions and reorganize.
Von Manstein quickly took advantage of his opportunity. Regrouping his
armor and aided by reinforcements from other sectors and theaters he
struck back at the dangerous salient which had been driven around
Kharkov. Starting on 21 February, his First and Fourth Panzer Armies
counterattacked north and south of the city and by 15 March cleared the
line of the Donets as far up as Belgorod. In the meantime, however,
Golikov had deepened the bulge he had driven around Kursk. By the end
of March operations had bogged down in the spring thaw generally along
the line the Germans held in the spring of 1942.
In the northern and central sectors operations were on a more limited
and less spectacular scale. On the Leningrad front the Soviets in the
middle of January launched a limited offensive which in five days cut
through a 10-mile wide corridor south of Lake Ladoga. This reopened
land communication with Leningrad which had been cut off for over 500
days. During the same period, units of Gen. V. D. Sokolovski's Kalinin
Front, which for months had slowly been pushing westward between
Army Groups North and Center, finally occupied Velikiye-Luki, but
failed in an attempt to take the Nevel hedgehog and cut the north-south
Dno-Nevel rail line. The only other change of note in the north was a
voluntary German withdrawal from the exposed Demyansk salient below
Lake Ilmen. In the central sector the Germans shortened and straightened
their front by withdrawing the Ninth Army from the Rzhev salient. This
line remained unchanged until July.
The 1942 operating year had started as the greatest in German
military history. The summer offensive had driven rapidly to the Volga