the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

134 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
became actively engaged in operations on three fronts against vastly
superior forces, and because of Hitler's refusal to shorten his eastern line
there was no strategic reserve. German divisions were so scattered that
everywhere they were forced to fight at an increasing disadvantage. The
U-boat campaign had been brought under control in 1943 in the Battle
of the Atlantic; and Allied bombing was beginning to take heavy toll of
German industrial output. With the approach of summer campaigning
weather in the east, Wehrmacht prospects were never darker.
At the start of the summer battles almost every consideration indicated
that the Soviets would strike their next major blow against Army Group
Center. The German hold in the center of the line constituted a huge
salient overhanging the Red Armies in the south which to the methodical
Russian mind had to be eliminated. The Russian forces there had not
been in serious action since the first of the year. Their supply line to
the great logistical center at Moscow was relatively short compared to
the overextended axes in the south, and, unlike the forces in the Ukraine,
they had had opportunity during a quiet winter to rehabilitate the rail
lines and build up large stocks near the front.
Nonetheless the Germans, with Hitler dominating almost every plan
and disposition, clung to the belief that the major Soviet blow of the
summer would be a continuation of the attack in the south, and disposed
their divisions accordingly: 37 infantry divisions, 11 panzer divisions,
and a miscellany of Romanian and Hungarian units in the south;
one panzer and 33 infantry divisions in the center. Strategic reserves in
the latter sector comprised the one panzer division, an infantry division,
and a panzer group made up of a number of miscellaneous motorized
units.
On 23 June the Soviets struck, and against Army Group Center. The
First Baltic and the three White Russian Fronts 15 launched a general
offensive on a 360-mile front from Velikiye-Luki to the lower Pripyat
behind a preparation fired by some 380 artillery pieces and mortars per
mile of line. The preparation inflicted heavy casualties on the German
front line troops and enabled the Red infantry to quickly open
a number of holes through which the armored brigades poured. Almost
immediately the German situation was desperate. There was no second
line of defense to fall back on, and the two reserve divisions were quickly
committed and almost as quickly destroyed. Chernyakovski with his
Third White Russian Front quickly surrounded Vitebsk and sent his
mobile reserves into the fight through a 25 mile gap south of the city.
One of his columns reached the Minsk-Smolensk rail line and highway
15 Rokossovski continued to command the First White Russian Front, but Sokolovski's
old Second White Russian Front was reorganized as the Second and Third
White Russian Fronts with Gen F. D. Zakharov and Gen I. D. Chernyakovski as
commanders.