the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF STALINGRAD
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on 25 June, cutting the Fourth Army's principal line of retreat. At the
same time Rokossovski broke his armored units into the Germans' rear
through a 20-mile hole in the Ninth Army's front, one column swinging
north to encircle Bobruysk, the other driving on to the west. On
27 June he surrounded Bobruysk and trapped some 70,000 German
troops. Both Orsha and Vitebsk fell on 27 June, and Mogilev the
next day. The loss of these anchors of the line split the front into three
segments and brought an end to defensive action on an army group
basis. Thereafter, German opposition deteriorated rapidly.
There was no letup in the attack, however, with Gen. I. Kh. Bagramyan's
First Baltic Front units driving on Polotsk and Chernyakovski
and Rokossovski's right wing enveloping Minsk from the north and
south. The fall of the latter city on 4 July trapped almost the entire
Fourth Army which was fighting some miles to the southeast. In just
10 days the Red Army had completely obliterated the Dnepr line between
Polotsk and the Pripyat River and destroyed 25 German divisions.
During the next week the pace continued with Baranovichi falling on
8 July and Vilna surrounded on 10 July.
In the southern sector Konev and Rokossovski's left wing launched
their summer offensive on 14 July. By 25 July Konev had surrounded
Lwow while Rokossovski, swinging more to the northwest to maintain
contact with his right wing, took Lublin on 22 July. Two days later he
reached the Vistula and on 31 July his units stood only some 12 miles
from Warsaw. With the drive through White Russia continuing, by
the end of the first week in August the fight in the central and southern
sectors had passed over the western boundary of the Soviet Union,
whence BARBAROSSA had been launched more than three years
before.
Further to the north, Yeremenko, now commanding the Second Baltic
Front had joined the general offensive on 13 July, attacking along an
80-mile front from Ostrov to the Dvina River. Model, then commanding
Army Group Center, had foreseen just such an attack in the north
and two days before it was launched had suggested that Army Group
North withdraw from Estonia and northern Latvia to below the Dvina
in order that its divisions might be used to stabilize the fast deteriorating
situation in the central sector, but Hitler turned down the proposal.
The Germans facing Yeremenko were strongly entrenched, but their
position was without depth, and' when Opochka, the central anchor of
the line, fell on 15 July they were forced to pull back to positions
along the Dvinsk-Pskov rail line and re-form.
Gen. I. I. Maslennikov now joined the fight with his Third Baltic
Front just below Lake Peipus, taking Ostrov on 21 July and Pskov two
clays later. On 25 July Yeremenko cut the road from Dvinsk to Riga,
and the next day captured Dvinsk itself, forcing the Germans back
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