the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

60 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German
occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is
of Communist origin.
b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic
measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the
authority of the occupying forces may be maintained, and further spreading
prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human
life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent
effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for
y. 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable
atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence
is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect. The reverse
course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and
of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe
measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not
be followed. 81
* * *
There is little evidence that these directives were carried out by the
line armies. The indications are that, with but few exceptions, 82 they
were ignored and the OKH policy was generally followed in the zone of
operations.
There was no attempt to soften the effect of such tactics by a change
in the psychological approach. Propaganda remained negative, and
even verged on the hypocritical. It was designed primarily to keep the
population from joining or supporting the partisans. They were to be
promised nothing. Beyond threats, warnings, and prohibitions, the
emphasis was to remain on the role of the Germans as "liberators" come
to create "a new system of social justice." The people in the individual
Soviet republics were to be given no expectation of the restoration of
their national sovereignty and no encouragement toward the development
of a national consciousness. There were to be told merely that
their political future would be worked out after the war. The peasantry
was to be cautiously told that for the time being the collective farms
were not to be broken up, that such would lead to too much economic
dislocation. The one concession granted was in the matter of religion.
The religious question was to be viewed as the business of the individual,
to be tolerated but not encouraged. 83
81
Kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung in den besetrten Gebieten, Der Chef des
Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, WFSt/Abt. 1 (IV/Qu), Nr. 002060/41. g. Kdos.,
16.IX.41. in I.M.T., op. cit., XXXIV, pp. 501-04; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
op. cit., VI, pp. 961-63.
82
See: Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, Armeeoberkommando 6, Abt. Ia-Az.,
7, A. H. Qu., den 10.X.41. in I.M.T., op. cit., XXXV, pp. 84-86.
83
OKW/WFSt/WPr (I a) Nr. 486/41 g. K., 21.VIII.41. OKW/1939.