the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

188 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
ing up to the line ran into an extensive mine field across their route of
march which was cleared without engineer aid and at the expense of a
number of casualties. Then early in February the bands began cutting
telephone lines so extensively that the Germans were often forced to
depend exclusively on radio. At times the radio failed and thus interrupted
command functions; at other times the partisans were found to
be tapping the lines and monitoring traffic.
As the Germans continued to shorten their front, however, they were
able to free some units for static road guard. Although there were never
enough units for offensive action against the bands, those available were
able to prevent complete paralysis from settling over the lines remaining
to them and hold down sabotage "to a bearable degree. 16
While the German withdrawal to the south was still in progress, Moscow
initiated steps to broaden the base of the partisan effort in the
northern sector. The Baltic States, and especially Estonia, throughout
the war had been singularly free of partisan interference because of
the general antipathy of the populance for the Soviet regime. When it
became obvious that the Germans were going to be unable to stabilize
their front east of the Narva-Pskov-Vitebsk line, the Soviets began dropping
numbers of Red Army and NKVD officers into the Estonia-Latvia
area in an attempt to organize partisan units even under the adverse
political conditions existing. 17 Apparently the first drops were
discovered and their mission correctly interpreted by the Germans.
As early as 23 January the army group had committed one battalion
of security troops along the straits between Lake Peipus and Lake
Pskov with the specific mission of preventing partisans from crossing
over into Estonia, and five days later the security command was
requesting three regiments of SS-trained native troops for the same
purpose. 18 Several days later the soundness of these precautions was
borne out when a radio message from Moscow ordering one band to
reconnoiter and report on ice conditions on both lakes was intercepted. 19
These attempts at infiltration also alerted the security command in
the Reichskommissariat Ostland, and on 28 January the Higher SS and
Police Leader Ostland requested the immediate drafting of 15,000
Estonians, 30,000-33,000 Latvians, and an additional 5,000 Lithuanians
to be formed into security units for antipartisan operations. 20
Apparently balked by the prompt German blocking of the narrows
between the lakes, several bands retired southward before the Wehr­
16 Entry for 6 Mar 44 in KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 1.III.-15.III.44. 75128/38.
17
Ibid.; OKI I/Abt. Frd. H. Ost (1/Bd), 29.II.44. H 3/361; Bandenlagebericht,
15.I.-1.I.44., OKH/Frd. H. Ost (I/Bd). EAPIV -38-x/7.
18 Entry for 23 Jan in KTB H. Gr. Nord, 12.I.-28.II.44. 75128/31;entry for 28
Jan in KTB, H. Gr. Nord, 24.I.-31.I.44. 75128/32.
19 Entry for 4 Feb in KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 1.II.-10.II.44. 75128/34.
20 Entry for 28 Jan in KTB, H. Gr. Nord. 24.I.-31.I.44. 75128/32.