the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE PARTISANS AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1943 163
on the rail lines and the attacks of the Red Air Force, the Germans
successfully moved 2,932 troop and supply trains in the sector during
the month. 60
This step-up in sabotage ahead of the northern wing of the Soviet
attack was reflected only to a lesser degree in the rest of the sector. In
the rear of the Second Army, which was defending along the western
edge of the Kursk salient, there was no appreciable change during July,
although a slight increase in partisan activity was noted for the latter
half of the month. There were few bands of any size in the area, although
several estimated to comprise as many as 500 men were dispersed attempting
to infiltrate eastward from the Pripyat. A number of attempts
to blow the rail lines were made using magnetic mines with time
fuzes. These were apparently designed to detonate in the middle of a
train, rather than under the flat cars loaded with rocks usually pushed
ahead of trains. Few were effective. 61 In the rear of the Fourth Army
the bands for the most part were quiet, making but 28 attempts on the
railroads mostly aimed at the Roslavl-Bryansk link. 62
The Third Panzer Army's rear remained similarly quiet until Soviet
pressure forced the withdrawal of two line divisions which had been
covering the Nevel-Vitebsk and Vitebsk-Smolensk rail links for commitment
on the Orel front. Following their replacement by but three
security battalions on 20 July, the bands almost immediately reappeared
and began raiding throughout the countryside, setting several chain
demolitions on both lines. 63 The area directly west of Vitebsk-Orsha
remained the critical sector. There, despite the presence of the 223d
Infantry Division, the bands continued to concentrate to such an extent
that the army command believed a complete clearing of the area prior
to the fall muddy season necessary for a successful winter defense. It
was estimated that six to seven line divisions would be necessary to do
the job. 64
Early in August the real blows fell. Once the German withdrawal
from Orel was well under way, Moscow ordered the bands to attack,
and on the night of 2-3 August they struck, "simultaneously," as directed.
During that one night they set 10,900 demolition charges and mines
60
Hermann Teske, "Railroad Transportation Operation ZITADELLE (1943),"
p. 16. MS # D-369. Foreign Studies Br, OCMH. This total includes supply
trains carrying ammunition, fuel, and rations, hospital trains, troop trains for the
army, Luftwaffe, railroad engineers, salvage platoons, and furlough traffic, and trains
for the Reichskommissariat and the economic administration.
61
AOK 2, la. An1 z. KTB, Bandenbekaempfung, Juli 43. 37418/108. Korueck
580, Ic. Tgb. Nr.2722/43 geh., 31.VII.43., KTB 26a, Teil 7. 37516/4.
62
Korueck 559, Ic. Tgb. Nr. 2952/43 geh., 31.VII.43., KTB Heft 3, Anl. 1-17.
45668/4.
63
Pr AOK 3, la. Nr. 6592/43 geh., 16.VIII.43., in H. Gr. Mitte, Bandenbekaempfung,
Akte XXII, Heft 11, 1. VIII.30.IX.43. 65002/23.
64
Ibid; Bericht, Juli, Pr AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anl. Bd. 2, Tgb. 9, 1.VIII.-30.IX.43.
40252/7.