the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES 45
of whom had to be party members or former members of the Komsomolsk,
14 and the remainder reliable in a political sense. Their primary
mission was the maintenance of internal security in the Soviet rear, defense
against German parachute attack, and the destruction of all installations
not demolished by the Red Army in its retreat. In the event of
the continued advance of the enemy, they were to allow themselves to be
bypassed and then operate as partisan units in the German rear, carrying
out sabotage missions and waging a campaign of terror among the
natives to prevent political deviation. 15
They were normally formed into regiments of 10 battalions, each
having its own commissar and surgeon. In addition to the commissar,
or perhaps to supplement him, in each battalion there was one group
entrusted with the political security of the unit with police power over
the remainder. The battalions were further subdivided into five groups
of 20 to 25 men each, including at least one man considered especially
safe politically. A majority of the personnel wore civilian clothes, none
a complete uniform. Although they were armed with Red Army ordnance,
they were not trained for formal combat and were not expected
to be used in the line. Under normal circumstances they lived off the
land. At the end of July the 285th Security Division reported it had
identified 10 of these regiments in its area of responsibility alone. 16
The Soviets Organize the Movement
By the first days of August a definite pattern of insurgent activity was
beginning to take form. The appearance of the annihilation battalions,
the parachute agent groups, and the local bands formed around Communist
Party cells and led by party functionaries and NKVD personnel
was the first evidence of any attempt on the part of the Soviet government
to set up and sustain a centrally directed irregular movement.
On 3 July Stalin had made his first public statement to the Soviet
people since the German attack. In this radio broadcast he stated:
In case of the forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be
evacuated; the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railroad
car, not a single pound of grain or a gallon of fuel. Collective farmers
14
The Communist youth organization.
15
KTB, 213 Sich, Div., 14424/4; radio announcement found 3 Jul 41 in Lwow
radio station, in Meldung 23, Einsatzgruppe C, 15.VII.41. 62/4; "Political Report
of the Administration of the Political Propaganda of the Northwest Front," in Anl. z.
KTB. I, H. Geb. Nord, 21. III--19.X.41. 14768/5; Meldung 51, Einsatzgruppe A,
3.VIII.41. 62/6; Meldung 31, Einsatzgruppe B, 23.VI.41. 62/5; rpt 2, 14 Aug 41
(doc. 2652), prosecution document book in N.M.T., op. cit. (Case 9) ; Meldung 95,
Einsatzgruppe A, 26.IX.41. Footlocker 62, folder 5.
16
"Final Report on Combating Partisans and Parachutists Along the Slucz River,
213th Security Division," 31 Aug 41. 14424/2; KTB, 285 Sich. Div., 31.VII.41.
14878/3 ; Meldung 51, Einsatzgruppe A, 13. VIII.41. 62/6.