the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

88 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
lose any sense of obligation they may have felt toward the German
command. 130 Units were committed piecemeal and with inadequate
training; nor was there provision made for casualty replacement. Some
battalion commanders were without transportation of any sort, even
animal, and frequently were out of contact with elements of their
commands for long periods of time. There was no set chain of command,
units being subordinated to any higher echelon in a hodge-podge fashion.
Liaison with higher headquarters was generally inadequate. 131
Fundamentally, the fault lay in the basic planning for the security
of the occupied territories and in the breakdown of the whole Wehrmacht
supply system during the winter. But the feeling ran through
the rear area commands that since "Centuries" were ultimately under
the command of the higher SS and police chiefs and might be pulled
from under Wehrmacht jurisdiction at any time without notice, despite
the fact that the Army had enlisted, equipped and trained them, they
should be placed low on the logistical priority list. l32
When the advent of the spring muddy period brought a slackening
of irregular pressure, several of the Koruecks pulled their native units
out for reorganization and short courses of intensive training. They
relieved many unqualified officers and noncommissioned officers and
made efforts to improve conditions of supply, pay and allowances. 133
This practice was not uniform throughout all the rear areas.
Late in the spring another factor entered the picture threatening
to further weaken the security commands. Most of the native units
had been mustered in on a short-term basis, and considering the generally
low state of their morals it was feared they would quickly disintegrate
when individual terms of service expired. l34 The Germans solved
this problem, however, by summarily extending the enlistments for the
duration of the war and making the personnel subject to the Articles
of War and thus liable to death for desertion. l35
130
Tlg, CO, Lith Security Bn at Kovno, to CG, Korueck 584, 10 Mar 42, in Anl.
92 z. KTB, Korueck 584, 17.XII.41.-31 .XII.42. 38998/2.
131
Rpt on condition of the Lithuanian Security Bns, 3 May 42, in Anl. 126
z. KTB 3, Korueck 584. 38998/2; rpt of foreign units, 7 May 42, in Anl. 825 z. KTB
1, Korueck 583. 34735/2.
132
Ibid.
133 Rpt on the condition of the Lithuanian Security Bns, 3 May 42, in Anl. 126 z.
KTB 3, Korueck 584. 38998/2.
134 Ltr, CO, Field Admin HQ 197, to Army Group South Rear Area, 10 Jul 42, in
KTB, H. Geb. "B". 25124/8; ltr, No. 465/42, Army Group North Rear Area to
Army Group North, 15 Jun 42, in KTB, H. Gr Nord. 75131/94.
135
Tgb., Ic, 339 Inf. Div., 16.VIII.-21.VIII.42., Anl. 1 z. KTB 8, 339 Inf. Div.,
26.VII.-31.XII.42. 29087/20; AOK 9, Nr. 4324/42, 26.IX.42., Landeseigene Verbende,
Anlagenband IV, Armee Befehle und Verfuegungen, AOK 9, I.IX.-7.X.42.
26791/8.