the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

152 The SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
German Countermeasures
Then too, the character of the opposition they faced cannot be overlooked.
Although the German security commands were badly handicapped
by a shortage of manpower, by making judicious use of what
strength they did have they were able in large measure to curtail any
offensive tendencies the bands showed. Keeping in view their primary
mission, the uninterrupted supply of the field armies, they drew themselves
in defensively on their lines of communication and installations
and then mounted what offensive actions they could. When troops
were available from the front lines, they launched large-scale drives.
In between times they sent out a steady stream of raiding parties and
small combat teams to probe for and strike at the bands and keep their
concentration areas in a continual state of flux. They also employed
"dummy bands," made up of Russian-speaking German officers and
NCO's and native volunteers passing themselves off as partisan units,
to seek out the more virulent pro-Soviet elements of the population and
mark them for roundup and evacuation. 19
As far as achieving permanent results was concerned, the larger-scale
operations had little success. When attacked in force, the bands simply
pulled back and dispersed and later regrouped in the same area. Time
and again the security commands reported they had annihilated a large
concentration or permanently cleared an area only to discover that their
enemy had merely slipped away until the opposition lessened. But combined
with the smaller actions which kept the bands under constant
pressure and possibly deceived them as to the low level of German
security strength," these larger-scale operations gave good results and
showed the security commands just what they could really achieve with
the manpower available. Although reports of operations repeatedly
carried the notation "band only dispersed,” "partisans escaped encirclement,"
or "no contact made," the Germans saw that every raid brought
some relief; that the temporary dispersion of a band meant that several
weeks would pass before it could be operative again; and that even failure
to make contact indicated that the band had gotten wind of the operation
ahead of time and had left its normal stamping grounds and bases.
They saw further that driving the partisans from an area gave an opportunity
to destroy their cantonments, airfields, and defensive installations
19
Special appendix to Nachrichten ueber Bandenkrieg, Nr. 1. OKH/Gen.St.d.H.
Fde H. Ost (II/Bd), Nr. 2460/43 geh., 3.V.43., in Kdr Gen. d. Sich. Tr. Sued, Ia.
Anl. Bd. 37, 30.IV.-1.V111.43. 39502/41; OKH/Gen.St.d.H./GenQu. Abt. Kriegsverw.
(Qu. 4), 10.117.43., to Op. Abt. Fde H Ost. Gen. d. Osttruppen OKW/Wpr.,
Auszug aus SD-Bericht Ost, Nr. 48, 2.1V.43. OKW 734.
20
For operations of these smaller groups, see: annexes 3b and 3c to Bericht des
Kdr. Gen. des Rueckw. Armeegebiets des Pz AOK 2, Nr. 1100/43 geh. z. Pz AOK 2,
20.V.43., Anl. 14. z. Azzl. Bd. 78, Bandenlage II, Pz AOK 2, 11.V111.42.-1.V11.43. 37075/91.