the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FALL OF STALINGRAD 131
During the first days of December Konev resumed his attacks in the
south, taking Cherkassy in the rear on 14 December and driving on to
Kirovo, which he entered on 7 January. The effect of this penetration was
to seriously threaten the rear of the German units in the Nikopol area as
well as that of the Eighth Army above Cherkassy on the Dnepr.
While these probing attacks were in progress, the main effort was in
preparation in the Kiev sector. During the first part of December Von
Manstein had continued his counterattacks east of Korosten and
Zhitomir, but on Christmas Eve Vatutin launched a new, large-scale
offensive which by 4 January had driven the Germans out of those two
cities and crossed the old Polish border south of the Pripyat Marshes.
The Winter Battles
In January 1944 the Red Army facing the Germans comprised 10
fronts. From north to south opposite Army Group North were Gen-
L. A. Govorov's Leningrad Front, Gen. K. A. Meretskov's Volkhov
Front, and Popov's Second Baltic Front; facing Army Group Center
across the upper Dnepr line Gen. I. Kh. Bagramyan's First Baltic Front,
Sokolovski's Second White Russian Front, and Rokossovski's First White
Russian Front; and driving against Army Group South were the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts under Vatutin, Konev,
Malinovski, and Tolbukhin respectively. The German order of battle
remained unchanged, with Von Kuechler commanding in the northern
sector, Busch in the center, and Von Manstein in the south.
The Soviets struck the first blow of the winter campaign against the
Eighteenth Army on the left flank of the Army Group North. With
the exception of the Russian attack to reopen land communication with
Leningrad the previous January, this 200 mile sector of the eastern line
had remained static for two and one-half years along the Volkhov River
and the Leningrad perimeter. The Eighteenth Army at this time comprised
the equivalent of 20 divisions including five Luftwaffe field divisions,'
two brigades of Latvian volunteers, and the Spanish Legion. It
had few reserves available, having transferred three infantry divisions
to Army Group Center in December to help contain the attacks in the
Nevel-Vitebsk area. Opposite these units the Russians had concentrated
the six armies of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts.
Looking at the map, the most likely point of attack for the Red Army
seemed the salient the Germans held directly south of Lake Ladoga,
since it furnished the principal cover for the rail net feeding the line
before Leningrad. The Soviets, however, had other ideas. For some
14 Divisions of Luftwaffe personnel fighting as ground troops. Officered from the
Luftwaffe, they were inadequately trained for ground combat and were deficient in
heavy weapons and artillery.