the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES IN OPERATION 75
Large numbers of the Russians encircled there, having been told by the
Soviet command that the Germans would let them starve to death,
took advantage of the shortages of guards and slipped eastward through
the front lines or joined the partisans. 69
The Partisan Picture Begins To Change
The failure of the final German assault on Moscow and the rapid
success of the Soviet counterattack brought about a distinct change in
the bases of the Russian defense effort and marked a turning point
for the partisan movement. For the first time the Red Army held the
initiative, and with its units exploiting the advantage the situation in
the German rear took on a new aspect. Not only was the spirit of the
troops and the partisan bands improved but the morale of the natives
whose support they needed was strongly bolstered. And as the early
tactical gains promised to develop into strategical victories with Soviet
units moving through and around the German divisions, the bands for
the first time were given an opportunity to make a direct military contribution.
It was a small contribution, perhaps, but it laid the foundation
for a more telling one later.
Concurrent with the Soviet counteroffensive in December, the attacks
of the partisans, which had begun to increase in November, reached an
even higher peak, accompanied as they were by widespread propaganda
and rumor mongering concerning the Russian successes. 70 The heaviest
pressure remained behind the Sixteenth Army where the northern wing
of the Russian attack had driven a breach in the line along the boundary
between Army Groups Center and North. There the number of rail
demolitions was steadily increasing. Train arrivals in the sector averaged
35 daily on 1 December but by 14 December dropped to an
"alarming low" due to partisan activity. 71
A similar situation existed in the central sector. During November
the bands had begun to concentrate in the extensive forests about
Bryansk. As the Soviet drive developed they began hitting sharply at
the railroads from this base in addition to launching numerous raids on
troop units and installations behind the overextended Second Panzer
Army and keeping the natives in the surrounding countryside in a constant
state of terror. By the first of the year their numbers had so
increased and their organization so improved that they completely
controlled 8 of the 10 rayons comprising the Bryansk Agricultural Ad-
69
Lagebericht, Ortskdtr, "Wyasma," 2.XI.41., KTB, Korueck 582. 17326/11.
70
Lagebericht Nr. L Wi Kdo. Bryansk, 9I.42., KTB. Bryansk, 17.XII.41.-31.III.42.
Wi/ID 2.84; KTB, Korueck 580, 24.XII.41. 16715/3.
71
Bericht, Wi Kdo. Pleskau, 27.XI.41., KTB, Wi Kdo. Pleskau, 1.X.-31.XII.41.
Wi/ID/2.189; Bericht, Aussenstelle 51, l.XII.41., KTB, Aussenstelle 51, 30.VIII.-
31.XII.41. Wi/ID 2.277. "Halder's Journal," op. cit., VII, p. 220.