the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

THE DECISIVE MONTHS: JANUARY-JUNE 1944 201
ern fringe of the region while police and SS units under the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber
Weissruthenien and elements of the Fourth Army had
established similar positions along the rail lines to the south and southwest.
Unlike the partisan units in the Ushachi battles, which had
fought as a unified command under the leadership of a single operations
group, the bands resisting the KORMORON drive operated under at
least two headquarters, one headed by a Red Army general officer, the
other by a Communist Party functionary, and were unable to offer a
coordinated defense. While they fought stubbornly at times, their resistance
lacked cohesion, and they were slowly pressed into a small
swampy area and cut to pieces. The fight was brought to a premature
conclusion by the opening of the Red Army summer offensive and a
number of small groups of partisans escaped. OKH considered the
area cleared and listed partisan casualties as 7,697 dead, 5,286 taken
prisoner, and 342 camps and 900 bunkers destroyed.
While these operations were in progress, there was a steady increase
in all types of partisan activity throughout the rest of the army group
rear. Not concerted enough to represent a "softening up" effort, it
seemed rather to be a deliberate attempt to make life miserable for the
Germans and whittle away at their strength while waiting for the Red
Army to strike. The bands not only increased the number of their raids
and the volume of their sabotage, but struck at larger and more critical
targets. Often supported by heavy weapons, they hit, beside the
lines of communication and signal facilities, at strong points, Germanoccupied
villages, and troops billets, and burned all settlements which
might be developed by the enemy into additional strong points. They
ceased withdrawing except in the face of overwhelming odds and offered
stubborn resistance to patrols, both of which were indicative of heightened
morale. Their supply by air was stepped up appreciably, especially
during the first three weeks of June, 44and additional specialists and
Red Army officers were air-landed or parachuted in to them. Late in
May a number of the bands in the Second Army rear which had
moved west in March to aid in the Red Army drive on Kovel were
driven back by a German counterattack to their old concentration areas
astride the supply corridors through the Pripyat. There they reorganized
in their old positions under the original blocking-canalizing plan. Such
was the picture when the storm broke.
The Final Blow
On the night of 19-20 June the partisans opened the preparation
for the long-expected Soviet offensive with their greatest single blow
of the war against the German lines of communication. That night,
44
Bericht, Mai, Juni 44, AOK 16, Ic/AO, Fnb. Bandenlage,1.IV-15.VII.44,
54323/8.