the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

94 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
Similarly in the northern sector the partisans intensified their raiding.
During the first 20 days of June attacks of all kinds, on small Wehrmacht
units, on rail and highway bridges, and military installations, rose almost
40 percent over May. 155 Behind the Sixteenth Army alone between 1
May and 31 July the partisans blew 30 bridges, broke rails in 84 places,
and damaged or destroyed 20 locomotives and 113 railroad cars, causing
a total of 1,129 hours interruption in service. 156
Behind Army Group Center the situation was similar, attempts to blow
the rail lines rising more than 100 percent from May to the end of Ju1y. l57
Still, despite these attempts to embarrass them, the Germans moved to
the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus without undue interference
with their supply. It is possible that Operation VOGELSANG caught
a number of southward-bound bands in transit and scattered them or
robbed them of much of their striking power. Certainly the partisans
found the lack of cover in the steppes a serious handicap, for it was not
until late August that there was any report of sabotage on the lines of
communication there. 158 Indeed, by the first week in September they
were reported moving back north again toward their Bryansk stronghold
without having touched the east-west Kiev-Kursk line which was the
primary logistical trunk feeding the attack. 159 During the same period
there were no reports of interference by bands which had been identified
in the Konotop area east of Kiev.
As for the demolitions in the northern and central sectors, they had
no visible effect on the main course of events. The figures themselves
are misleading. The nearly 40 percent increase in partisan attacks in
the northern sector for the first 20 days in June, it must be remembered,
included attacks of all kinds, large and small, successful and unsuccessful
and of the rail damage there, 75 percent occurred on the north-south
Dno-Novosokolniki line which although important was never a primary
supply link. 160 Similarly, in the Army Group Center rear where rail
demolitions rose more than 100 percent in three months the actual
count was 71 charges successfully detonated on the lines with varying
effect as against 31 unsuccessful attempts in May and 145 successful
155
CG, Army Group North Rear Area, to Army Group North, 24 June 42, in KTB
H. Gr. Nord. 751 28/11.
156
Anlagenband W-VI, Partisanen-Sonderakten, 1.VIII.-31.VIII.42., Teil 5 z.,
KTB 5, AOK 16. 36588/60.
157
Kdr. Gen. der Sicherungstruppen und Bfh. im H. Geb. Mitte, Ia, Br. B. Nr.
2051/43 geh., 9.VII.43., Anl. z. KTB, H. Gr. Mitte, ll.VI.31.VII.43. 65002/22.
158 Entries for 23 Aug 42 and 16 Sep 42 in KTB 2, Teil 4, Ia, 1. VII.-30.IX.42., Pz
AOK 2. 28499/4.
159
Lagebericht, Ia, Pr AOK 2, Nr. 1838/42, 6.IX.42. and 11.XI.42, Anl. z. KTB,
Pz AOK 2, 16.VIII.42.-28.11.42. 37075/90.
160
Anlagenband W-VI, Partisanen-Sonderakten, 1.VIII-31.VIII.42., Teil 5 z.
KTB 5, AOK 16. 36588/60.