the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

EARLY RUSSIAN RESISTANCE AND GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES 51
Lake Peipus where the Red defenders had resisted stiffly and virtually
immobilized Hoeppnerys panzers for some weeks. Here probably few
of the demolitions can be credited to the irregulars. Still the fact that
the annihilation battalions were sent out from Leningrad in such numbers--and
apparently with considerable effectiveness since as early as
3 August they controlled almost the entire area behind the Fourth Panzer
Group--with the primary mission of destroying all important installations
which the Red Army had been forced to bypass indicates that at
least a portion of the demolition work fell to them. 37 After the middle
of September, when the Russian operational units had been driven within
the Leningrad perimeter, all sabotage in the northern sector must be
considered to have been carried out by the partisans.
In Army Group Center, however, where Von Bock struck with great
speed and overpowering weight of armor, the Red Army was apparently
far too disorganized to carry out any planned destruction of rail facilities.
Of a total of 11 7 bridges and culverts destroyed or heavily
damaged, only 22 lay in the strategically vital entrance to the "dry route”
to Moscow, the triangle Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk, and none were so
badly damaged as not to be in use again before 15 September. Along
the main supply route, the double-track rail line Brest-Litovsk-Minsk-
Orsha-Smolensk, there were no bridges blown or tracks broken west of
the entrance to the "dry routey' triangle. The bulk of the demolitions
occurred in areas exposed to partisan pressure, in the Pripyat Marshes
and in the marshy forests to the south of Lake Ilmen and the Valdai
Hills. 38
In Von Rundstedt's sector, where the German advance was relatively
slow, it is evident from the area in which the demolitions were concentrated
that Budenny was able to carry out considerable sabotage on the
rail 'net. Of the 14 1 rail bridges destroyed, a number of them were on
major connections directly to the west of the Kiev bastion and in the
Dnepr bend industrial area west and northwest of Dnepropetrovsk.
These must be attributed directly to Red Army action. But in the lower
edges of the Pripyat along the Korosten-Mozyr line and in the Sarny-
Rovno-Kovel area, where the irregulars exerted considerable pressure
on the security units, there were a large number of bridges blown and
long sections of trackage destroyed. The same was true in the eastern
foothills of the Carpathian range and in the marshes along the upper
courses of the Bug River. It is probable that these latter were due directly
to irregular action. As inconclusive as these figures and the surmises
made upon them appear, especially in light of the low level of
efficiency of the partisans during the first months of the campaign and
37
Ibid; Lage Ost, 3 Aug. 41.
38 Streckenzustandskarte,Stand vorn 22.VI.--16.IX.41., H 14/570.