the soviet partisan movement 1941-1944 by edgar m. howell

122 THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
literally scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, almost invariably
it comprised such a miscellany of units that effective tactical coordination
proved nearly impossible, and as a consequence objectives were rarely
attained. Static defense forces were often of similar makeup. 19
Despite these difficulties, superior German organization and planning
in the main served to offset any advantage the partisans might have
gained at the time. The bands were growing in strength and experience,
but they were still building, spreading their influence, and reorganizing,
and they still lacked the aggressiveness to be more than a threat for
months to come. Yet their potential as an effective military force was
good and they would have to be hit hard again and again if they were
to be prevented from attaining it.
The changes of policy designed to undermine the movement by weaning
away its external support by the people and weakening it from.
within by granting preferential treatment to partisan deserters were
likewise "too little too late." While they were a distinct improvement,
the time had since passed when the mass of the people could be brought
over into the German camp. Then also, these changes applied only
to agencies actively engaged in the antipartisan fight. The civilian
administrators of the Reichskommissariate, among them those who filled
Sauckel's labor quotas and the officials of the economic administration,
remained outside their application and served to offset any gains made
by other agencies in this sphere.
19
See: Bericht, Korueck 584, 27.VII.42., Anl. 159 z. KTB 3, Korueck 584,
38998/2; KTB 2, Teil 5, Pz AOK 2,4.X.42. 28499/5.